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I. INTRODUCTION
Property ownership begets responsibility. Not surprisingly, in re-
cent years landowners, landlords, business owners, and other land
possessors have, at times, been held responsible for injuries caused by
the criminal acts of third persons that occur on their premises. While
quite a bit of case law has developed over recent years as to a land-
owner's liability for criminal acts that have occurred on the premises,
a landowner's liability for failing to disclose potential harm from crim-
inal activity to prospective tenants or property buyers has not been
established.2 It has also not been established whether a landlord has
the duty to screen prospective tenants to protect other tenants from
criminal behavior or a duty to warn other tenants of known criminal
propensities of an existing tenant.3
Finally, it is not clear whether a landlord or landowner may refuse
to rent or sell to a particular individual or disclose concerns about the
criminal propensity of certain individuals to other tenants or property
2. However, some courts have held a landlord liable for criminal acts committed
against tenants who had not been warned of physical defects that made the
premises susceptible to crime. See Tracy A. Bateman & Susan Thomas, Annota-
tion, Landlord's Liability for Failure to Protect Tenant from Criminal Acts of
Third Person, 43 A-L.R.5th 207 § 10(a) (1996).
3. See id. at § 37 (discussing liability of landlord for failure to protect from or warn
of another tenant). This Article does not address the situation where a shop-
keeper is asked to comply with a robber's demands in order to avoid injury to
customers held as hostages. See Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court,
927 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Cal. 1997) (holding that shopkeeper does not have a duty to
comply with criminal demands in order to protect customers); Vicki Lawrence
MacDougall, Premises Liability After the KFC Case: Potential Liability of a Com-
mercial Establishment to a Customer Injured By Provocation of an Armed Robber,
50 CONSUMER FIm. L.Q. REP. 397, 398 (1996) (discussing whether scope of prem-
ises liability should be expanded to include "the duty to not provoke an armed
robber, or to comply with the demands of an armed robber, to avoid unreasonably
increasing the potential risk of harm to the customer").
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owners without being subject to tort liability or violations of fair hous-
ing act statutes. A recent judicial decision in Texas requiring con-
victed child molesters to post disclosure signs on their residences and
cars has also engendered controversy over the constitutional and pri-
vacy rights of these individuals.4
This Article will explore the landowner liability issues of whether
to disclose or warn others about future criminal activity that might
occur on the premises in the future. The duty to warn others about
criminal activity is based on the tort concept of premises liability,
while the duty to disclose the presence of criminals in the area is a
recent departure from the common law rules of caveat emptor 5 and
caveat lessee. Part II will describe the historical development in tort
law of premises liability for the criminal acts of others.6 This part will
also discuss recent trends in premises liability law, including how
premises liability theories impact issues of workplace violence, school
violence, Internet site liability, terrorist activity, and insurance
coverage.
While Part II focuses on the landowner's potential duty to protect
against criminal acts of third parties, Part III will address the issue of
whether landowners have a duty to disclose or warn of premises sus-
ceptibility to criminal acts. Megan's Law legislation, dealing with
community notification about the presence of convicted sex offenders,
raises a particularly troublesome disclosure issue.
Part IV examines landowner liability for refusing to rent or sell to
individuals with criminal backgrounds or for disclosing to others the
criminal propensity of a third party. 7 Some jurisdictions have pro-
4. Larry Copeland, Does "Scarlet Letter" Judge Cross the Line? Some Applaud
Texas Jurist for Taking Creative Approach to Sentencing Sex Offenders, USA To-
DAY, July 10, 2001, at A5, available at 2001 WL 5466528 ("Banales, 50, touched
off a wave of controversy-and earned the sobriquet 'the Scarlet Letter judge'--
on May 18. After reviewing probationers' statuses, he ordered 14 of about 45
registered sex offenders to place 18- by 24-inch warning signs in their yards:
'DANGER: Registered Sex Offender Lives Here.' Banales ordered them to put
similar signs in automobiles they ride in and bumper stickers on cars they own.").
5. See Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (identifying a duty
to disclose a material defect in real estate).
6. This Article will not address the issue of whether a landowner can be held liable
for third party criminal attacks on adjacent premises. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Archi-
bald & Kendall, Inc., 573 F.2d 429, 430 (7th Cir. 1978) (presenting, in a diversity
case, legal question of "whether the owner or occupier of land has a duty of rea-
sonably guarding an invitee against criminal attacks that take place beyond the
boundaries of his premises and on a public thoroughfare"); Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill
Park Apartments, Inc., 688 A.2d 1018, 1021-22 (N.J. 1997) (holding that landlord
did not owe a duty to tenant to protect him from known criminal danger on neigh-
boring property).
7. In particular, the community notification laws under Megan's Law have been
challenged as violating common law privacy rights and constitutional rights such
as due process and equal protection. Sex offenders have also claimed that these
[Vol. 80:522
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tected landowners and their agents from liability for failing to disclose
the presence of sex offenders in the neighborhood by legislating that
such facts are not material to the transaction. This nondisclosure pro-
tection has been incorporated into existing psychological taint or
stigma legislation which shields landowners from disclosing facts such
as a previous death occurring on the property or that a previous occu-
pant had been infected with AIDS. The Article concludes by sug-
gesting that landowners who are aware of reasonably foreseeable
criminal activity against occupiers of their premises should have a
duty to disclose this information to either prospective or existing oc-
cupiers, particularly when there is a potential danger of harm to
children.
II. PREMISES LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL ACTS OF OTHERS
A. Historical Development Under Tort Law
To understand the dilemma courts and legislatures face in decid-
ing whether or not to require landowners to disclose the potential for
criminal activity on the premises, it is important to understand the
development and current contours of premises liability for the crimi-
nal acts of others. Historically, courts held that there was no duty to
protect others from third party criminal acts.8 Instead, the criminal
act has been found to be the proximate cause of any injury and public
policy dictated that the owner or occupier of property not be an insurer
against third-party criminal behavior occurring on their premises.9
Nevertheless, courts are increasingly assigning liability where the
criminal act is sufficiently foreseeable. Courts have created excep-
tions to the "no-duty-to-protect-others" rule based on either statutory
obligation or the existence of a special relationship between the owner
or occupier of the property and the crime victim.i0
The evolving concept of the landlord's implied warranty of habita-
bility has also contributed to an increase in landowner liability for
laws are cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, or ex post facto laws.
See generally Madelyn J. Daley, Do Sexually Violent Predators Deserve Constitu-
tional Protections? 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 715 (1999); Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The
Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation,
and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90
Nw. U.L. REv. 788 (1996); Jane A. Small, Who Are the People in Your Neighbor-
hood? Due Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74
N.Y.U. L. RBu. 1451 (1999).
8. See GLEN WEISSEN3ERGER & BARBARA B. McFARLAND, T . LAW OF PREmiSES LIA-
Birry § 11.2, at 292 (3d ed. 2001) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TonTs § 314
and comments (1965)); Fowler Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the
Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934)).
9. WEISSENBERGER & McFARLAND, supra note 8, §§ 11.2 to 11.3, at 292-93.
10. Id. § 11.2, at 292 (describing the relationships of innkeeper and guest, school and
pupil, and hospital and patient as examples of exceptions to the no-duty rule).
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premises conditions contributing to criminal activity. The critical is-
sue is whether or not a duty on the part of the landowner has been
created, despite the historical "no-duty" to protect against the criminal
acts of others. Once a duty is established, which is a question of law, 1
the plaintiff must show a breach of that duty (a question of fact) and
that the injury was proximately caused by the landowner's breach.12
1. Creation of a Duty
a. Special Relationship Between Business Possessors or
Landowners and Invitees
Business possessors or landowners have been held liable in tort for
the criminal acts of third persons based on the assignment of a duty to
warn or protect invitees under certain circumstances. Under the Re-
statement Second of Torts, section 344, a possessor of land held out to
the public for business purposes is
subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for
such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or in-
tentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the
possessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such acts are being
done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to enable the
visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it. 1 3
Comment f clarifies the landowners' business possessor's duties ex-
plaining that:
Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily
under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that
the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may,
however, know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a
likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is likely to
endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on
the part of any particular individual. If the place or character of his business,
or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or
criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some par-
ticular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to
provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable
protection.1 4
Therefore, before a business possessor, who may or may not be the
landowner, is charged with a duty, the business possessor must have
11. See Toscano Lopez v. McDonald's, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 510 (Ct. App. 1987) (hold-
ing that as a matter of law, the mass murder of 21 people in a San Ysidro McDon-
ald's was "so unlikely to occur within the setting of modern life that a reasonably
prudent business enterprise would not consider its occurrence in attempting to
satisfy its general obligation to protect business invitees from reasonably foresee-
able criminal conduct").
12. See id. at 448 (determining that causation is typically a question of fact "but,
where reasonable men will not challenge the absence of causality, the court may
treat the question as one of law and take the decision from the jury").
13. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965).
14. Id. § 344 cmt. f.
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knowledge from past experience that criminal activity is likely to oc-
cur or the nature of the possessor's business must be such that crimi-
nal activity of third persons can reasonably be anticipated.1 5
The issue of whether the possessor has a reason to know that crim-
inal acts might occur is framed in the tort language of foreseeability.
Foreseeability may be based on either the knowledge of prior similar
criminal acts or the totality of the circumstances and may be consid-
ered a question of law in this context of determining duty.16 Some
jurisdictions require that the foreseeability be in regards to a risk of
imminent harm to an invitee. For example, in MacDonald v. PKT,
Inc.,17 the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that "merchants have a
duty to respond reasonably to situations occurring on the premises
that pose a risk of imminent and foreseeable harm to identifiable invi-
tees" but that they do not have a duty to anticipate third party crimi-
nal acts or provide security against such activity.'8 The Virginia
Supreme Court reiterated a similar rule in Thompson v. Skate
America, Inc., holding that "despite the existence of that special rela-
tionship, the business owner does not owe a duty of care to protect its
invitee unless it 'knows that criminal assaults against persons are oc-
curring, or are about to occur, on the premises which indicate an im-
minent probability of harm to [its] invitee.'"'9 The court held that this
duty does not arise until there is "'notice of a specific danger just prior
to the assault.'" 20
When the court uses prior criminal activity to determine foresee-
ability and, hence, liability, one of the major issues is whether or not
the prior crimes resembled closely enough the criminal activity gener-
ating the claimed injury. In Hendrickson v. Georgia Power Co.,21 the
court applied the test of foreseeability as stated by the Georgia Su-
preme Court in Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker,2 2 which requires
the court to:
inquire into the location, nature and extent of prior criminal activities and
their likeness, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question...
While the prior criminal activity must be substantially similar to the particu-
lar crime in question, that does not mean identical .... [What] is required is
that the prior [incident] be sufficient to attract the [landlord's] attention to the
dangerous condition which resulted'in the litigated [incident]. 2 3
Finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove a specific number of
criminal incidents occurred on the defendant's property before the
15. WEISSENBERGER & McFARLAND, supra note 8, § 11.3, at 294-95.
16. See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993).
17. 628 N.W.2d 33 (Mich. 2001).
18. Id. at 44.
19. 540 S.E.2d 123 (Va. 2001).
20. Id. at 127 (quoting Wright v. Webb, 362 S.E.2d 919, 922 (Va. 1987)).
21. 80 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (M.D. Ga. 2000).
22. 482 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1997).
23. Hendrickson, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (quoting Sturbridge, 482 S.E.2d at 341).
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murder, the court also found that even if the incidents could be shown,
there was no evidence that they occurred in the same vicinity as the
murder and "the nature of the previous criminal activity was vastly
different than the incident that occurred here"24 because it "involved
domestic disputes or rowdy behavior," not murder.25
In fact, "[tihe most probative evidence on the question of whether a
criminal act was foreseeable is evidence of prior criminal activity com-
mitted."26 However, the court in Connelly v. Family Inns of America,
Inc. ,27 explained that factors such as where the prior crimes occurred,
what type of crimes were committed, and the amount of criminal ac-
tivity must be considered.28 Thus, the court held that the defendant
motel owner should have been aware of criminal incidents occurring
near the motel and should have taken reasonable steps to protect its
guests from third party criminal acts.2 9
The totality of the circumstances approach is where the court looks
at whether the overall criminal activity in the area is at a level requir-
ing the landowner to take reasonable action to provide safety to invi-
tees, guests, or tenants. 30 For example, in Isaacs v. Huntington
Memorial Hospital3' the California Supreme Court accepted this test
in lieu of relying only on the existence of prior similar acts to establish
foreseeability and determined that a hospital failed to provide ade-
quate security, resulting in a doctor being shot in the parking lot.32
The court found that the overall criminal activity in the area estab-
lished foreseeability even though prior similar shootings had not
occurred.33
The California Supreme Court "refined" this rule in Ann M. v. Pa-
cific Plaza Shopping Center34 by imposing a higher degree of foresee-
ability based on proof that there had been similar violent crimes on
the premises or surrounding areas before a duty was imposed on a
landowner. 35 The Tennessee Supreme Court in McClung v. Delta
Square Ltd. Partnership36 adopted what they called the "balancing
24. Hendrickson, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1382.
25. Id.
26. Connelly v. Family Inns of Am., Inc., 540 S.E.2d 38, 41 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
27. 540 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
28. Id. at 41.
29. Id. at 43.
30. See, e.g., Delta Tau Delta, Beta Alpha Chapter v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 973
(Ind. 1999) (holding that the "totality of the circumstances" test should be applied
to determine whether a landowner owes a duty to protect an invitee from third
party criminal acts).
31. 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985).
32. Id. at 659.
33. Id.
34. 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993).
35. Id. at 215.
36. 937 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1996).
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approach" used in the Ann M. decision to balance the costs of imposing
a duty on owners and occupiers of business premises to protect cus-
tomers from the criminal acts of others against the forseeability and
gravity of harm from such third-party crimes.3 7
The totality of the circumstances test was adopted by the South
Dakota Supreme Court in Small v. McKennan Hospital.3 s Citing the
Isaacs decision, the court reversed a summary judgment for the defen-
dant hospital to give the plaintiff an opportunity to show that foresee-
ability of the rape and murder of a hospital invitee after being
abducted from the hospital parking area was not necessarily based on
previous similar criminal acts, but rather on the surrounding facts
and circumstances.3 9 Texas has also adopted a totality of circum-
stances test to determine whether or not the criminal act on the land-
owner's premises was foreseeable. 40 The Texas Supreme Court in
Timberwalk Apartment Inc. v. Cain4 ' concluded that:
[i]n determining whether the occurrence of certain criminal conduct on a land-
owner's property should have been foreseen, courts should consider whether
any criminal conduct previously occurred on or near the property, how re-
cently it occurred, how often it occurred, how similar the conduct was to the
conduct on the property, and what publicity was given the occurrences to indi-
cate that the landowner knew or should have known about them.4 2
Similarly, Massachusetts courts require that juries consider the to-
tality of the circumstances to decide whether a criminal act was fore-
seeable. In Mullins v. Pine Manor College,4 3 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failure to show prior criminal
acts on campus was not a bar to the college's liability for the campus
rape of a female student and that, instead, the totality of the circum-
stances should be used to determine whether the criminal act was
foreseeable. 44
In some jurisdictions, neither the existence of prior similar acts nor
an examination of the totality of the circumstances may be necessary
in certain situations. Parking garages and other parking facilities
37. See id. at 901-02. See also Loren Singer, Tennessee Expands Merchants' and
Property Owners' Duty to Protect Customers from Criminal Attacks, West's Legal
News 11665, Nov. 1, 1996, available at 1996 WL 628668.
38. 403 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1987).
39. Id. at 413-15.
40. See George C. Hanks, Jr., When Sticks and Stones May Break Your Bones: An
Overview of Texas Premises Liability Law for Business Owners, 60 TEx. B.J. 1010,
1014 (Nov. 1997).
41. 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998).
42. Id. at 757. The court wrote: "[t]hese factors-proximity, recency, frequency, simi-
larity, and publicity-must be considered together in determining whether crimi-
nal conduct was foreseeable. Thus, the frequency of previous crimes necessary to
show foreseeability lessens as the similarity of the previous crimes to the incident
at issue increases." Id. at 759.
43. 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983).
44. Id. at 337.
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have been considered inherently dangerous, such that the plaintiff
need not show either prior criminal acts or meet the totality of the
circumstances test in order to prove foreseeability.4 5 A business pos-
sessor may also be held liable for criminal acts resulting from a risk
created by the business itself.46 In Osborne v. Stages Music Hall,
Inc.,47 a bar customer was allowed to sue the bar owner for injuries
she received on the public sidewalk outside the club during an assault
by two men who had previously been ejected from the club.4 8 Al-
though the injuries did not occur on the bar owner's premises, the
court found that the club bouncers, who had ejected the men, had
merely "exported the club's problems to the sidewalk and then ignored
the troublemakers while allowing two female patrons to leave through
locked doors into the path of potentially dangerous men."49 Therefore,
the court held that the attack could be considered reasonably foresee-
able, thus creating a duty by the club to guard against such an
attack.So
Finally, a business possessor or landowner can be held liable for
negligently performing the voluntary undertaking of security mea-
sures to protect invitees.5 i In Martin v. McDonald's Corp.,5 2 McDon-
ald's was held liable for a franchise restaurant employee's death,
which occurred during a robbery, because the corporation had volun-
tarily assumed a duty to protect the franchisee's employees by employ-
ing a regional security manager to act as a security supervisor for the
franchisee.53
45. See G. Robert Friedman & Kathleen J. Worthington, Trends in Holding Business
Organizations Liable for the Criminal Acts of Third Persons on the Premises: A
Texas Perspective, 32 S. TEx. L. REv. 257, 286 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Merchs. Natl Bank v. Simrell's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 383,
386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing "the duty of a tavern owner, engaged in the
sale of intoxicating beverages, to exercise 'reasonable care to protect guests and
patrons from injury at the hands of irresponsible persons whom they knowingly
permit to be in and about the premises'" (quoting Ember v. BFD, Inc., 490 N.E.2d
764, 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted))); Jeffords v. Lesesne, 541 S.E.2d
847, 851 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that "the place and the character of the
activity [a bar serving alcohol] was such as to raise a factual issue concerning the
reasonable foreseeability of such conduct and the necessity of taking reasonable
precautions, such as providing security").
47. 726 N.E.2d 728 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
48. Id. at 734.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Merchs. Nat'l Bank, 741 N.E.2d at 388 (observing that "[tihe assumption of a
duty creates a special relationship between the parties and a corresponding duty
to act in the manner of a reasonably prudent person"); see also Andrew K. Miller,
Understanding Premises Liability for Third Party Crimes, 80 ILL. B.J. 311 (June
1992).
52. 572 N.E.2d 1073 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
53. Id. at 1078.
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b. Special Relationship Between Innkeeper and Guest,
Landlord and Tenant
Other special relationships have generated a duty to warn or pro-
tect others against third party criminal activity. Courts have recog-
nized that a special relationship exists between innkeepers and guests
such that the innkeeper has a duty to protect against reasonably fore-
seeable criminal acts against its guests. 54 Using the analogy of the
special relationship between the innkeeper and guest, the court in the
landmark case of Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment
Corp.55 held that an apartment landlord had a duty to protect tenants
against foreseeable risks of crime.5 6 Since the Kline decision, the
landlord-tenant relationship has been a broad source of potential
landlord liability for third party crimes committed on rented
premises.57
Foreseeability for purposes of landlord liability is treated similarly
to the concept of foreseeability for business possessors. For example,
in Samson v. Saginaw Professional Building, Inc.,58 the Michigan Su-
preme Court found that it was foreseeable to the landlord that a crimi-
nally insane patient from a state mental clinic renting space in the
building could attack other building tenants in the common areas,
such as the elevator.59 This foreseeability was based upon the magni-
tude of the risk and the fact that this concern had already been
brought to the landlord's attention by other tenants in the building.60
However, in Gill v. New York City Housing Authority,61 the court re-
fused to hold a landlord responsible for determining whether or not a
mentally ill tenant would be dangerous to co-tenants and informing
other tenants of such an evaluation.62
The source of a landlord's duty is not restricted to a tort duty based
on the special landlord/tenant relationship. In fact, some courts have
54. See Irma W. Merrill, Note, Landlord Liability for Crimes Committed by Third
Parties Against Tenants on the Premises, 38 VAND. L. Rav. 431, 436 (1985) (dis-
cussing historical development of landlord duty to tenants based on innkeeper-
guest relationship).
55. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
56. Id. at 484; see also Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 615 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2000) (noting that the special relationship between landlord and tenant
is created "as the logical extrapolation of the existing common law governing the
special-relationship between innkeeper and guest" when the tenant signed the
lease and released to the landlord the exclusive control over security).
57. See WEISSENBERGER & McFARLAD, supra note 8, § 11.15, at 309.
58. 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975).
59. Id. at 849.
60. Id.
61. 519 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1987).
62. Id. at 370 ([A] landlord is not competent to assess the dangerous propensities of
his mentally ill tenants, nor does he have the resources, or control over his te-
nants necessary to avert the sort of tragedy presented by this case.").
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held "that a landlord-tenant relationship is not a special relationship
engendering a duty on the part of the landlord to protect tenants from
criminal attack."63 The Virginia Supreme Court, in a trio of land-
owner premises liability cases decided on January 12, 2001,64 stated
in Yuzefovsky v. St. John's Wood Apartments6 5 that "we have consist-
ently rejected the contention that the relationship of landlord and ten-
ant, without more, constitutes a special relationship such that a duty
of care may arise with regard to the conduct of a third party."66 How-
ever, there are other exceptions which do create a landlord's duty such
as where "an especial temptation and opportunity for criminal miscon-
duct brought about by the defendant will call upon him to take precau-
tions against it;"67 where an overriding foreseeability exists;6S or
where a landlord voluntarily assumes a duty to provide security.6 9
Therefore, the landlord may have a duty to provide security in com-
mon areas to prevent foreseeable criminal activity, or a landlord who
voluntarily undertakes to provide security may be held liable if this
voluntary duty is performed negligently.70
Some jurisdictions have held condominium associations liable for
injuries sustained in criminal attacks occurring on the premises based
63. Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 106 (N.H. 1993) (citations omitted).
64. See Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc., 540 S.E.2d 129, 133 (Va. 2001) (holding
that a business owner has no duty to warn or protect invitees from third party
criminal acts unless business owner has knowledge of an imminent probability of
harm); Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Skate Am., Inc., 540 S.E.2d 123, 130 (Va.
2001) (holding evidence showing that Skate America knew of perpetrator's pro-
pensity to assault other invitees sufficient to show that there was an imminent
probability of harm generating a duty of care to protect its invitee); Yuzefovsky v.
St. John's Wood Apartments, 540 S.E.2d 134, 141 (Va. 2001) (holding that a spe-
cial relationship between landlord and tenant generating a duty of care to protect
a tenant is not established unless landlord knows "that criminal assaults against
persons were occurring, or were about to occur, on the premises that would indi-
cate an imminent probability of harm to [the tenant]").
65. 540 S.E.2d 134 (Va. 2001).
66. Id. at 140.
67. Walls, 633 A.2d at 106 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAw OF TORTS § 33, at 201 (5th ed. 1984)).
68. See id.
69. See id. (noting that a voluntary assumption of duty implies a duty to act with
reasonable care).
70. See B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nusiance & Forfeiture Standards Im-
posing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
679, 695-702 (1992) (discussing how some courts have assessed liability against
the landlord when the landlord has chosen to provide some security measures but
has failed to exercise reasonable care in the performance of the undertaking); see
also Bateman & Thomas, supra note 2, at 315 (discussing cases where courts
have held that a landlord has a duty to protect tenants from criminal acts based
upon express or implied contract principles).
[Vol. 80:522
MY BROTHER'S KEEPER?
on a tort theory parallel to the landlord's duty of care to tenants. 7 1 If
the association conducts itself in a way similar to a landlord by provid-
ing security, maintaining common areas, etc., a court will likely hold
the association to a landlord's duty of care standard. In Frances T. v.
Village Green Owners Ass'n,7 2 the California Supreme Court held that
a condominium association could "be held to a landlord's standard of
care as to the common areas under its control."73 Therefore, the court
concluded that the victim, a condominium owner who was molested,
raped, and robbed in her unit, had alleged facts sufficient to show that
the association had a duty of care, which was breached when it failed
to supply additional lighting. The court determined that this type of
harm was foreseeable even though the foreseeability was based on
prior crimes in the complex that were not identical to the crimes per-
petrated against the victiM.74
Common law exceptions to the concept of caveat lessee,75 such as
the duty to maintain common areas in a reasonably safe manner 76 or
the duty to perform tasks voluntarily undertaken without negligence,
can be used to create a duty to provide safe premises.7 7 A duty may
also arise from contractual concepts such as the implied warranty of
habitability,78 the duty of good faith and fair dealing found in a lease,
or a contractual promise to repair.79 In fact, some courts find landlord
liability for foreseeable criminal acts of third persons "only where the
act was based on a physical defect of the premises."8O Finally, land-
lords may have a statutory duty to provide and maintain security of
71. Phyllis M. Rubinstein & William A. Walsh, Jr., Little House of Horrors: May a
Condominium Association Be Held Liable for Failure to Provide Adequate Secur-
ity or Maintenance in the Common Areas?, 22 U. RICH. L. R.v. 127, 138 (1988).
72. 723 P.2d 573 (Cal. 1986) (en bane).
73. Id. at 577.
74. See id. at 579.
75. See THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.46, at 350 (William B. Stoebuck & Dale A.- Whit-
man eds., 3d. ed. 2000) (discussing the "general common-law rule that the land-
lord has no duty to repair leased premises").
76. But see Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 216 (Cal. 1993) (con-
cluding that landlord did not have a duty to provide security guards in the com-
mon areas because rape of tenant's employee was not foreseeable).
77. See Glesner, supra note 70, at 685-86 (describing the exceptions from general rule
that landlords have no legal duty of protection, which include injuries caused by
defects in the common premises, failure to disclose a latent defect in the premises
causing injury, and injuries resulting from negligence in undertaking promised
repairs).
78. See Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 443 (N.J. 1980); see also Merrill, supra
note 54, at 442-43.
79. See THE LAw oF PRoPERTY, supra note 75, § 6.47, at 349.
80. Bateman & Thomas, supra note 2, at 349; see also Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633
A.2d 103, 107 (N.H. 1993) (rejecting "liability based solely on the landlord-tenant
relationship or on a doctrine of overriding foreseeability" and refusing to find a
duty where "a landlord has made no affirmative attempt to provide security, and
is not responsible for a physical defect that enhances the risk of crime").
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the premises for their tenants.SX However, the leading theory in land-
lord liability is based on the tort law of negligence where "the landlord
is liable if, having a duty to provide security, he fails unreasonably to
perform that particular duty, thereby facilitating the commission of
the crime that injures the tenant or others on the leased premises or
on common areas."
8 2
c. Other Special Relationships
The special nature of certain other relationships has also justified
a landowner/possessor's duty to protect or warn against criminal acts
on the premises. An institution of higher education may be held liable
for third party criminal activity as a landowner or as a landlord if the
institution has knowledge of prior similar criminal acts on its prem-
ises.8 3 The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Mullins v. Pine Manor
College84 found that a college had a duty to protect students against
third party criminal acts because of the nature of the college situation,
which presented an opportunity for criminal acts against resident stu-
dents, particularly young women.8 5 Both parents and students had a
reasonable expectation that the college would exercise reasonable care
to protect resident students from foreseeable harm.86
The relationship between students and higher education institu-
tions has not always supported premises liability claims. In Tanja H.
v. Regents of University of California,8 7 the court held that such a spe-
cial relationship did not exist and that the university did not have a
duty to protect female dormitory residents from sexual assault by
other dormitory residents, although the fact that the dorm stairway
was unlighted may have been considered relevant if the assault had
been perpetrated by a third-party intruder.8 8 Nevertheless, whether
based on the school-student relationship under tort and property law
or a negligence standard for failing to warn or protect its invitees, uni-
versities and college campuses may be found liable for student injuries
resulting from criminal activity on their premises.89
81. See, e.g., Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 615 N.W.2d 397, 402 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000) (involving ordinance requiring locks for certain areas of an apartment
building).
82. THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 75, § 6.47, at 346.
83. See Kelly W. Bhirdo, The Liability and Responsibility of Institutions of Higher
Education for the On-Campus Victimization of Students, 16 J.C. & U.L. 119, 125-
26 (1989).
84. 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983).
85. See id. at 335.
86. See id. at 336.
87. 278 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Ct. App. 1991).
88. See id. at 920-21.
89. See Bhirdo, supra note 83, at 134-35 (recommending that school administrators
implement crime prevention measures).
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In addition to the special relationship between school and student,
other relationships indicating the existence of a duty are the hospital/
patient relationship, the common carrier/passenger relationship, and
"any other relationship in which someone surrenders himself or her-
self to the care of another."9 0 Yet, some courts refuse to find a special
relationship, even when there is some degree of expectation that the
landowner or possessor should have a duty. For example, in H.B. v.
Whittemore,9 1 the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to hold a trailer-
park manager liable for failing to protect children from a resident who
had a prior conviction for child molestation of which the manager was
aware. 9 2 This relationship seems very close to the innkeeper/guest re-
lationship, but the court refused to find that a special relationship
existed.
No special relationship was found in Metropolitan Dade County v.
Dubon,9 3 where the court held that a non-profit shelter for the home-
less did not have a duty to protect its homeless residents against the
criminal attack of another resident.9 4 Although this relationship also
seems quite similar to the innkeeper/guest relationship, the court de-
termined that because both the victim and the attacker "were abso-
lutely free to come and go as they chose" there was no special
relationship because the shelter did not "have either the right or abil-
ity to control the assailant third party's behavior."95 In Part II B.1.,
below, the development of new types of special relationships is
discussed.
2. Breach of Duty
Once a plaintiff has established the existence of a duty, it must be
shown that the landowner failed to exercise reasonable care to protect
against the foreseeable criminal acts. Determining breach is a ques-
tion of fact and will likely depend on "(1) whether the owner took rea-
sonable steps to ascertain the extent of the potential harm; (2)
whether the owner provided sufficient warning to the customer to
avoid the harm; and (3) whether the owner furnished reasonable mea-
sures to protect the customer from harm."96
A duty existed, but no breach of that duty was found in Washing-
ton v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
90. William Edward Taylor & Joseph M. Taylor, A Plaintiffs Approach to the Prepa-
ration of Premises Liability Cases Based on the Criminal Acts of Third Persons,
53 J. Mo. B. 98, 100 (1997).
91. 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996).
92. See id. at 709.
93. 780 So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
94. See id. at 330.
95. Id. at 329-30.
96. See Hanks, supra note 40, at 1014.
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ment,97 where the owner of an apartment building owed a duty to the
tenants to discover whether criminal acts were occurring on the prop-
erty and to warn tenants and visitors about such harms.9 8 The court
found that the property owner did not breach this duty to discover and
warn tenants because there was not sufficient evidence to show that
the property owner knew or should have known that such harm would
occur. Further, the tenant was already aware of particular criminal
acts that had occurred in the complex and chose to continue residing
on the property despite the dangerous conditions. 9 9
Thus, while the landlord had a duty to protect its tenants, the duty
was not breached by the landlord's failure to protect or warn because
the landlord had no knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
potential for criminal activity in the complex. Nevertheless, while
breach of a duty is required for tort liability, such breach will typically
be evident if the duty to protect or warn is based upon the foreseeabil-
ity of the criminal activity and the landlord fails to take action to pro-
tect tenants against such potential harm.
3. Causation
In order to hold a landowner liable for injury, the plaintiff must
prove that the landowner's conduct or omission to act caused or con-
tributed to the injury.10 0 Courts have refused to hold land possessors
liable for the criminal acts of third parties, even if the crime was rea-
sonably foreseeable, based on the plaintiffs failure to prove causa-
tion.1O1 In Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp.,10 2 the court held that the
victim tenant did not establish the necessary causal link between the
victim's injuries from a criminal attack in the building and the land-
lord's failure to provide proper security because she did not show that
the attacker entered the building through a negligently maintained
entrance.1o 3 Similarly, in Price ex rel. Price v. New York City Housing
Authority,i04 the court held that the victim tenant must establish
proximate cause for her injuries by proving that the attacker was an
97. 953 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
98. See id. at 773.
99. See id. at 774.
100. See, e.g., Toscano Lopez v. McDonald's, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 447 (Ct. App. 1987)
(finding no causal connection between mass murder in San Ysidro McDonald's
and McDonald's failure to provide security).
101. See, e.g., Tucker v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 689 F. Supp. 560, 564 (D. Md. 1988)
(finding that "the absence of private security guard service was not the proximate
cause of plaintiffs injuries" which occurred during an altercation between two
customers standing in line at the restaurant).
102. 706 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 1998).
103. See id. at 1166.
104. 706 N.E.2d 1167 (N.Y. 1998).
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intruder who gained access by entering through a negligently main-
tained entrance.1 05
Lack of causation recently precluded a plaintiff from claiming dam-
ages from an assault which occurred in an apartment complex in Sael-
zler v. Advanced Group 400.106 The California Supreme Court
concluded that a Federal Express employee, who was assaulted by
three men inside an apartment complex while attempting to deliver a
package to a resident, could not show that the apartment owners'
"failure to provide increased daytime security at each entrance gate or
functioning locked gates was a substantial factor in causing her inju-
ries."' 0 7 The plaintiff was unable to identify her assailants and,
therefore, it was possible that they could have been either unautho-
rized trespassers or tenants of the apartment complex. If the assail-
ants were tenants of the complex, who would have been authorized to
enter the premises, any increase in the security would not have pre-
vented the attack. 0 8
B. Recent Trends in Premises Liability
Recent trends in premises liability are also instructive when deter-
mining whether or not landowners should be liable for failing to dis-
close the danger from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.
Commentators have remarked that there is a trend to hold property
owners liable for third party criminal acts in both commercial and res-
idential settings because of a jury's desire to compensate crime victims
when the only defendant may be the property owner or where the
fault can be apportioned between the perpetrator and the property
owner.109 However, recent decisions in Michigan and Virginia have
limited landowner liability by using a narrower forseeability stan-
dard, which requires that a business invitor "knows that criminal as-
saults against persons are occurring, or are about to occur, on the
premises which indicate an imminent probability of harm to its invi-
tee" before it is liable for third party criminal acts.1 i0
105. See id. at 1169; see also Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 791
(Ct. App. 1996) (finding tenant raped in a parking garage did not prove that land-
lord's negligence in maintaining a garage gate caused the injury because there
was no evidence that the rapist entered or exited through this gate).
106. 23 P.3d 1143 (Cal. 2001).
107. Id. at 1152.
108. See id.
109. See Joseph B. Rizzo, Negligent Premises Security Law: The Foot is Still in the
Liability Door, 70 N.Y. ST. B.J. 38, 41 (1998) (discussing a recent case where the
jury apportioned fault at 51% to the property owner and 49% to the perpetrator,
who raped an 81-year old plaintiff after entering through a first story window
with a broken lock, which the landowner had not repaired).
110. Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc., 540 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Va. 2001) (quoting
Wright v. Webb, 362 S.E.2d 919, 922 (Va. 1987) (emphasis added)); see supra
notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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This trend toward limiting premises liability to imminent harm
situations is evident in the 2001 decision by the Virginia Supreme
Court in Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc. 11 The court held that the
golf club had no duty to protect a customer against a criminal assault
by an unknown third party because the facts did not establish that
there was an imminent probability of harm and the burden of provid-
ing security against such an assault would be unduly burdensome." 2
Similarly, the golf course had no duty to warn the golfer of the poten-
tial danger of such attacks because such a warning could potentially
harm the golf course business and result in a loss of trade." 3
Landowner liability has also been expressly limited by statute
when public policy issues outweigh the victim's right to sue the land-
owner for injury." 4 Nevertheless, the trend is to hold landowners lia-
ble for third party criminal activity and essentially treat it as a "new"
tort framed as "you must take reasonable precautions with respect to
your property to protect victims from foreseeable wrongdoing by third
parties."115 Some have viewed this as the courts' attempt to assist
crime-fighting efforts "by enlisting property owners in the battle
through the threat of tort liability."116
1. New Types of Special Relationships
As previously discussed, many jurisdictions have held landlords li-
able for injury to their tenants from third party criminal acts based
upon a special relationship derived from an innkeeper's duty to pro-
vide security for guests. Other types of special relationships, such as
school/student, tavern/customer, hospital/patient, and common car-
rier/passenger have also generated a duty to protect or warn against
third party criminal activity if the appropriate foreseeability exists.
In addition, several new relationships, including employer/employee
and bank/ATM customer, and new situations, such as the potential for
terrorist acts, have generated premises liability for third party crimes
111. 540 S.E.2d 129 (Va. 2001).
112. See id. at 133.
113. See id. at 133-34.
114. See, e.g., Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc., 537 S.E.2d
345, 347 (Ga. 2000) (observing that Georgia's Recreational Property Act limits
landowner liability where the owner "has made property available without
charge to the public for recreational purposes" such that the Olympic games com-
mittee, as lessee of park property, was not liable for injuries caused by the park
bombing during the 1996 Olympic Games).
115. Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Experi-
ence with "New" Torts, 49 DEPAuL L. REv. 455, 459 (1999).
116. Id. at 459.
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as exceptions to the historical common law rule of "no duty to aid"
others against intervening criminal acts.1 17
The employer/employee relationship has been especially compel-
ling where employees are injured by a co-worker or former co-worker
on business premises. In Wright v. St. Louis Produce Market, Inc.,1is
a food processing plant employee was murdered by a co-worker at a
food processing plant and the victim's mother sued the company for
wrongful death alleging that the company did not make its premises
reasonably safe and did not protect the employee against the criminal
acts of her co-worker.1 9 The court noted that a duty to protect an-
other person from third party criminal activity may arise based upon
either a special relationship or "special facts and circumstances."12o
The "special facts and circumstances" theory as explained by the
Wright court, appears to deal with foreseeability issues such as
whether the third person is known and identifiable, whether there
have been frequent and recent violent criminal acts on the premises
by unknown attackers, and whether a landlord creates a danger or
risk of tenant harm above the risk of crime expected generally.121 The
court did not use the special relationship theoryl 2 2 and it found that
the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence under the "special
facts and circumstances" theory that: the employer knew of the at-
tacker's violent propensities; it had sufficient time to :prevent the at-
tack; prior crimes were sufficiently similar to put the employer on
notice that employee safety was at risk; or the food company's actions
created a risk greater than the general crime risk in the area.1 23 Nev-
ertheless, the court did find that the company may have breached its
duty to provide a safe work environment, but noted that workers' com-
pensation provides the sole remedy in such circumstances.1 24
Although the court in Wright did not use the special relationships
theory, jurisdictions finding a special relationship between employer
and employee could use the theory to create a duty to protect or warn
employees about the dangerous propensities of a co-worker. This duty
to protect or warn would be particularly appropriate in situations
where a co-worker has been disciplined or terminated and has ex-
pressed anger with the employer or has directly threatened violence.
117. See, e.g., Melinda L. Reynolds, Landowner Liability for Terrorist Acts, 47 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 155 (1996) (discussing premises liability for the terrorist acts of third
parties such as the World Trade Center bombing).
118. 43 S.W.3d 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
119. See id. at 408.
120. Id. at 410.
121. See id. at 410.
122. See id. at 410 n.4 (observing that "[s]pecial relationships are not at issue in this
appeal").
123. See id. at 411-13.
124. See id. at 415.
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In Rosh v. Cave Imaging Systems, Inc.,12 5 a recently terminated em-
ployee returned to the business premises and shot and severely in-
jured the manager who had terminated him.12 6 The injured employee
sued the security company, whose guards failed to deny the disgrun-
tled ex-employee access to the facilities, even though they had been
informed several times of the terminated employee's unauthorized
presence.127 The jury awarded the manager damages in excess of five
million dollars for the severe injuries which were found to be the fore-
seeable result of the defendant's negligent failure to provide adequate
security at the company.128 Although the defendant here was an in-
dependent security company, not the landowner or possessor, if secur-
ity had been provided by the landowner or possessor, premises
liability might have been the theory used and the injury would have
been foreseeable.
Sometimes, workplace violence is an extension of domestic violence
and employees may be injured by an angry spouse or ex-spouse seek-
ing revenge against a co-worker in the workplace. Employers may be
held liable for injury to employee victims of such violence if they fail to
provide a safe work environment or ignore domestic violence issues
that spillover into the workplace.12 9 Unlike the Wright case, dis-
cussed above, where the plaintiff was limited to a remedy under work-
ers' compensation, an employer may be held directly liable for injuries
in the workplace resulting from domestic violence if the employer
knew or should have known of the potential violence and did not take
appropriate action to prevent the resulting injury.' 30
An employer may be liable for a third party injury to an employee
where the employer has assumed a contractual duty to protect the em-
ployee from harm.13i Foreseeability that the criminal activity might
occur in the workplace, based either on prior similar acts or a totality
of the circumstances test, may also create a duty by the employer to
protect employees.13 2 Finally, an employer may be held liable for a co-
worker's violence on the job based upon theories of negligent hiring,
negligent supervision, and negligent retention.133 However, these
125. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136 (Ct. App. 1994).
126. Id. at 138-39.
127. Id. at 139.
128. Id. at 137.
129. See Jennifer Moyer Gaines, Comment, Employer Liability for Domestic Violence
in the Workplace: Are Employers Walking a Tightrope Without a Safety Net?, 31
TEX. TECH L. REv. 139, 147 (2000) (noting that "when domestic violence enters
the workplace, employers may be susceptible to liability for injuries resulting
from an inherently private relationship").
130. See id. at 148.
131. See id. at 150-53 (discussing cases where the employer promised to protect an
employee in the workplace).
132. See id. at 153-54 (discussing foreseeability in establishing employer duty).
133. See id. at 159.
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theories are only applicable in a situation when the employer has con-
trol over the employee-perpetrator and are not relevant where a third
party criminal invades the workplace and injures employees. There-
fore, employer liability for criminal acts by non-employees against em-
ployees must be based on premises liability, emphasizing the special
nature of the relationship between employer/employee and establish-
ing foreseeability of the violence.
Another potential special relationship involves a bank and its ATM
customers based on the increasing concern for customer safety, espe-
cially at night. The bank, as a business possessor, has a greater duty
of care because of its special relationship with its customers as invi-
tees. However, the victim of a third party ATM crime must prove fore-
seeability before the bank is required to provide protection.' 3 4
In Boren v. Worthen National Bank of Arkansas,135 customer Ste-
phanie Boren was shot and robbed by two men hiding in the bushes as
she drove up to a drive-through ATM to withdraw cash.136 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court held that the bank was not liable for the attack
because "two incidents of robbery at Worthen ATMs in the nearly
eight years prior to the attack on Boren [were] not sufficient to impose
a duty"1'3 7 based on the foreseeability of the attack. While banks have
not been held liable for third party ATM crime under premises liabil-
ity theories,'3s several states have attempted to regulate ATM secur-
ity by requiring minimum lighting, restricting the height of
landscaping near ATMs, and requiring the use of reflective mirrors.1 3 9
Therefore, if a bank undertakes to provide security as required by
statute, future cases involving negligent security may result in bank
liability.
Premises liability issues may eventually emerge in cyberspace as
property and tort concepts are applied to Internet sites. It is conceiva-
ble that a user who is attacked by a computer virus while visiting a
particular web site will attempt to hold the web site owner liable for
any injury caused by the third party criminal act.' 40 Online chat
rooms facilitating Internet relationships may also be subject to liabil-
134. See Jennifer Juhala DeYoung, ATM Crime: Expanding the Judicial Approach to
a Bank's Liability for Third Party Crimes Against ATM Patrons, 30 VAL. U. L.
REv. 99, 101-02 (1995).
135. 921 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. 1996).
136. Id. at 936; see Chris A. Averitt, Bank Not Liable forAttack on ATM Patron: Boren
v. Worthen National Bank of Arkansas, 50 Am L. REv. 521 (1997).
137. Boren, 921 S.W.2d at 942.
138. See DeYoung, supra note 134, at 102 ("Courts deciding ATM cases have been
reluctant to hold banks liable for third party crimes.").
139. See id. at 111-16.
140. See Robin A. Brooks, Deterring the Spread of Viruses Online: Can Tort Law
Tighten the 'Net'?, 17 REv. LrrnG. 343, 346 (1998) (describing how a computer




ity for criminal acts involving minors and criminals such as
pedophiles. If the chat room host is aware that its invitees may be
subject to online criminal attacks, there may be a duty to warn or pro-
tect the invitees, particularly minors, from foreseeable harm.
Terrorist activity may also generate premises liability in those in-
stances when a landowner knows that the property is particularly at-
tractive or susceptible to attackl 4 l and fails to take appropriate
security precautions or warn tenants or occupants of the danger. Af-
ter the World Trade Center was bombed in 1993, suits were filed
against the owner of the complex, the Port Authority, alleging prem-
ises liability for its negligence in assessing the foreseeablity of the at-
tack or providing protection in anticipation of such an attack.142
However, the World Trade Center owner will not likely be liable for
the September 11, 2001 attack, which involved commercial airplanes
flying into the buildings, because such an attack could not be pro-
tected against by security measures within the owner's control. Nev-
ertheless, given that there were previous acts of terrorism in 1993, the
Port Authority may be subject to suit for failing to disclose the danger
of a terrorist attack to tenants who leased space after 1993. It could
be argued that disclosure would not be necessary due to the publicity
and general knowledge of the 1993 attack. Such an argument would
be similar to the claim that a landowner does not have to disclose the
susceptibility of the premises to crime or to a local sex offender be-
cause such information is publicly available through police records.
Finally, recent "rage" incidents, such as those that have occurred
at ballparks between coaches and referees or parents, or on airplanes
between passengers or between passenger and agent, may generate
third party premises liability claims.143 A Continental Airlines agent
is suing the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and the se-
curity firms responsible for the airport's gate areas under a negligence
theory for injuries he received when a passenger waiting to board at-
tacked the agent for stopping him from entering the jetway without
his boarding pass. 144
In Hills v. Bridgeview Little League,145 a little league coach was
attacked and beaten by the manager and assistant coaches from the
141. See Melinda L. Reynolds, Landowner Liability for Terrorist Acts, 47 CASE W. REs.
L. REv. 155, 174 (1996) (discussing the "tempting target" theory which "proposes
that some leaseholds are by their nature particularly attractive for crime: bars,
concert halls, and casinos").
142. See id. at 158.
143. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Rage, 87 A.B.A. J., July 2001 at 28.
144. Id. at 30 (noting that the agent will rely on a 1993 New Jersey Supreme Court
decision which held the Port Authority liable for injuries suffered by a passenger
who was attacked by a homeless man inside a bus terminal).
145. 745 N.E.2d 1166 (Ill. 2000), reh'g denied, (2001).
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opposing team during a little league baseball tournament. 146 The Illi-
nois Supreme Court held that the baseball league, which hosted the
tournament, had no special relationship with the coach who was at-
tacked by the opposing team's coaches and that the nature and sever-
ity of the attack was not foreseeable.14 7 Nevertheless, it has been
suggested that leagues and sport facilities can help avoid these rage
incidents by properly training coaches and officials, holding
mandatory parent meetings regarding the rules of appropriate specta-
tor behavior, and enforcing the rules and policies.148
2. Apportionment and Comparative Liability
Because of the dramatic increase in the number of claims brought
against landowners on behalf of crime victims alleging that the land-
owner negligently failed to warn or protect them against third-parties
on the premises, determining whether and how to apportion this lia-
bility between the "deep-pocket" landowner and the judgment-proof
assailant is an important issue. 14 9 In Rosh v. Cave Imaging Systems,
Inc.,150 the court upheld a jury verdict assigning greater fault for the
victim's injuries to the security firm than was assigned to the disgrun-
tled employee who returned to the company premises to shoot the
manager who terminated him.151 The court found that the apportion-
ment of 75 percent fault to the security firm was supported by evi-
dence that the firm was hired to protect the employees against
terminated employees posing a security risk and that the firm allowed
the terminated employee to remain on the premises on three different
occasions within twenty-six hours of his termination.152
Fault for injuries suffered from a third party criminal act may also
be apportioned between the landowner and the victim in situations
where the victim fails to take appropriate protective action. If the vic-
tim fails to use proper door locks, somehow provokes or initiates the
attack, or is aware of the danger or risk and does not take appropriate
precautions against injury, the victim's compensation may be reduced
according to such fault.
146. See id. at 1170.
147. See id. at 1191 (explaining that no special relationship could be found because
playing field was not a business open to the general public and because there was
"no evidence of record to support the conclusion that youth coaches and managers
in Illinois are, as a group, prone to commit criminal attacks").
148. Tebo, supra note 143, at 33.
149. See Alan Kaminsky, Annotation, Apportionment of Liability Between Landowners
and Assailants for Injuries to Crime Victims, 54 A.L.R.5th 379 (1997).
150. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136 (Ct. App. 1994).
151. See id. at 139-40.




Insurance policies for homeowner liability typically include an ex-
clusion for bodily injury or property damage "expected or intended" by
the insured. The exclusion is intended to bar coverage for injuries
caused by the insured which are the result of intentional, not negli-
gent, homeowner conduct. Jurisdictions are split as to what consti-
tutes the insured's intent:
(1) The minority view follows the classic tort doctrine of looking to the natural
and probable consequences of the insured's acts; (2) The majority view is that
the insured must have intended the act to cause some kind of bodily injury; (3)
A third view is that the insured must have had the specific intent to cause the
type of injury suffered. 1 5 3
The third view requiring specific intent was applied by the court in
Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Hastei 5 4 where the insured was sued
for the wrongful death of his victims, whom the insured took captive
and held against their will in his home and subjected to torture, which
resulted in their deaths.i55 The trial court found that insurance cov-
erage for these acts was barred because the insured intended to kill
the victims. i 56 However, the reviewing court reversed the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of the insurance company on the question
of damages based on the death of the victims because it found a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether the insured "expected or in-
tended the result which occurred, i.e. the death of these
individuals."157 In light of this result, it has been suggested that
homeowners' policies should include a specific criminal acts exclusion
so that "if a crime is serious enough for the criminal courts to permit
or require the offender to be incarcerated, then there is no reason for
insurers (and each of their law-abiding policyholders) to have to pay
the cost of such crime. " i58
Similarly, in State Auto Mutual Insurance Co. v. McIntyre,15 9 a
federal court applying Alabama state law held against the insurance
company by concluding that a grandfather had no specific intent to
153. Janet K. Colaneri & Bobbi Reilly, Non-Actor Liability for Sexual Assaults in
Texas and the Effect of Insurance on Recovery, 2 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 279, 309
(1995) (citing W. Nat'l Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 719 P.2d 954, 960 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1986)).
154. 824 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
155. See id. at 43-44.
156. See id. at 44.
157. Id. at 46 (holding additionally that "[tihe trial court did not err by precluding
recovery against Economy on the question of damages for injuries to the victims
prior to death" because there was no question that the insured intended to harm
the victims).
158. Daniel C. Eidsmoe & Pamela K. Edwards, Home Liability Coverage: Does the
Criminal Acts Exclusion Work Where the "Expected or Intended" Exclusion
Failed?, 5 CONN. INs. L.J. 707, 729 (1998-1999).
159. 652 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. Ala. 1987).
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cause injury when he sexually abused his minor granddaughter and,
therefore, he "neither expected nor intended that his nonviolent sex-
ual abuse... would cause her bodily harm.1 60 Because the state's
interpretation of the insurance coverage exclusion clause "expected or
intended by the insured" required the court to determine specific in-
tent from the insured's standpoint, the exclusion did not bar coverage
unless "the insured subjectively possessed a high degree of certainty
that bodily injury to another would result from his or her act."' 6 '
Some jurisdictions have not required the finding of a specific intent
by the insured in order to bar insurance claims for intentionally harm-
ful acts. In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Smith,162 the Ninth
Circuit held that an exclusion provision in the homeowner's insurance
policy which denied coverage for injury "either expected or intended
by an insured" was not to be applied using a subjective standard.163
As a result, the insurance company was not liable for the insured's
sexual molestation of his adopted daughter since under Nevada state
law such molestation of minors is presumed to be harmful.164
The cases discussed above involve claims against the insured's
homeowner policy for criminal acts perpetrated by the insured. How-
ever, claims brought against an insured's homeowner policy for the
criminal acts of a third party on the insured's premises are also sub-
ject to policy exclusions for intentional and criminal acts. In C.P. v.
Allstate Insurance Co.,165 the insured homeowners' adult son sexually
assaulted an eleven-year-old friend of the homeowners' daughter
while the homeowners were out of town.166 The victim and her par-
ents sued the homeowners and their son for personal injury alleging
that the son's assault caused their daughter injury and that the home-
owners were negligent in failing to watch over the victim and in fail-
ing to warn her parents of the son's alleged propensity to assault
children.167 The claims against the homeowners were based on their
alleged negligence, not by attributing the criminal actions of their son
to them.168
The Alaska Supreme Court accepted certification of three ques-
tions of state law from the federal district court, including the ques-
tion of whether
160. Id. at 1194.
161. Id. at 1193-94.
162. 907 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1990).
163. See id. at 902.
164. See id. ("[Ulnder the law of the state, one cannot intend the act of molestation
without also intending the harm.").
165. 996 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 2000).
166. See id. at 1218-19.




a homeowner's liability insurance policy that provides coverage against 'acci-
dental' injuries and excludes coverage for intentional and criminal acts ...
treats the acts of one insured as the acts of all insureds... and [indemnifies]
an insured homeowner who is sued for.., negligent failure to protect a visitor
lawfully on the premises from foreseeable criminal activity.1 6 9
The court concluded that the exclusions for intentional and criminal
acts do not apply to negligence claims against the homeowners be-
cause the alleged negligence was neither intentional nor criminal,
therefore, the victim's claims against the homeowner's policy were
covered.17o Because premises liability for landowners is based on neg-
ligence concepts of duty under a foreseeability standard, homeowners'
insurance policies that cover "accidents" and exclude intentional and
criminal acts will likely cover claims against homeowners for injuries
caused by the criminal acts of third party perpetrators.
Commercial landowners, on the other hand, may find themselves
unprotected against claims for third party criminal acts. In light of
the recent terrorist attacks, insurance companies are expected to ex-
clude terrorist attacks, in addition to acts or war, from property insur-
ance policies.i 71 Alternatively, insurance companies may provide only
limited terrorist coverage by restricting the overall policy limits and
charging higher premiums.i7 2 Even with insurance coverage for the
World Trade Center destruction, the owner of the lease to operate the
World Trade Center, Larry Silverstein, is arguing that the attacks
constitute two incidents, not one, requiring insurers to pay $7 billion
instead of $3.5 billion.'73 The U.S. Congress has been debating legis-
lative relief to address the problems of terrorist insurance, but as of
January 2002, has not yet developed an insurance bill to handle the
issues.' 7 4
169. Id. at 1222.
170. See id. at 1226.
171. See NATIONAL POLICY BULLETIN, TERRORISM INSURANCE COVERAGE MAY BE UN-
AVAILABLE UNLESS CONGRESS ACTS SOON (2001) (proposing that the U.S. govern-
ment help commercial property owners by ensuring that they will be covered
against terrorist acts in the future).
172. See James E. Branigan, Insurance Issues Resulting from the Attack on America-
September 11, 2001, N.Y. ST. B.J., REAL PROPERTY LAw SECTION ANNUAL MEET-
ING IN NEW YORK CITY (Jan. 24, 2002) (paper on file with the Nebraska Law Re-
view). For updated information on the issue, see the National Association of
Insurance Commissions (NAIC) website at http'//www.naic.org/lnews/releasesl
re101/12210lNAICMmbrsCmToAgrmntRgrdExcs.
173. See Jan Hopkins, World Trade Center Attack Insurance Lawsuit, CNNFN: STREET
SWEEP (Oct. 23, 2001) (discussing the law suit by the leaseholder of the World
Trade Center against the reinsurers).
174. See Branigan, supra note 172 (noting that retail insurance companies are in the
"position of not having reinsurance for terrorist risk").
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III. A DUTY TO WARN OR DISCLOSE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF
PREMISES TO CRIMINAL ACTIVITY?
Part II above surveyed the general contours of premises liability,
which potentially holds landowners and possessors liable for the crim-
inal acts of third parties. Liability is typically based on a negligence
standard which requires that the landowner/possessor have a duty to
warn or protect invitees against foreseeable criminal activity and that
the breach of this duty proximately causes injury to the invitee. Part
III develops an approach towards landowner disclosure duties from
this historical baseline and proposes that: (1) a landowner has a duty
to warn others of potentially dangerous individuals on its premises;
(2) a landlord has a duty to disclose to prospective tenants the suscep-
tibility of rental premises to criminal activity; and (3) a landowner has
a duty to disclose to a purchaser of the property criminal activity in a
neighborhood.
A. Duty of Landowner or Possessor to Warn Others of the
Presence of a Dangerous Person
Landowners cannot always protect against third party criminal ac-
tivity, especially when the condition of the property is not the cause of
injury and the criminal is already permitted on the premises. How-
ever, victims of third party criminal acts may sue those knowledgeable
about the potential for criminal activity based on a failure to warn.175
In Eric J. v. Betty M.,176 the mother of a molested child sued the fam-
ily members of a man convicted of child molestation, but the court
held they had no liability under the longstanding "no duty to aid" rule
for failing to warn the man's girlfriend of his criminal record.177 The
convicted felon molested his girlfriend's eight-year-old son at the
homes of several of the felon's family members and the girlfriend sued
the family members on the basis of premises liability.178 The court
found that in the guest-residence scenario, the issue is different from a
business possessor's duty to protect or warn against foreseeable third
party criminal acts in that it deals with "whether landowners can in-
cur tort liability for failing to predict the actions of a real, flesh-and-
blood human being, not just a general threat of crime based on the
175. See, e.g., J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 935 (N.J. 1998) (holding that a spouse has a
duty to warn minors of the potential for sexual assault by his or her mate, if the
spouse knows, or has reason to know, that the mate is likely to engage in sexually
abusive activity). But see Apple v. Tracy, 613 N.E.2d 928, 929 (Mass. App. Ct.
1993) (finding that a homeowner was not liable for the sexual assault of a neigh-
borhood child for failing to warn neighbors about the presence of a houseguest
who had been convicted and imprisoned for the sexual assault of a minor).
176. 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549 (Ct. App. 2000).
177. Id. at 560.
178. See id. at 552-53.
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laws of probability given statistics that the property is in a high crime
area."
179
Citing the Anaya v. Turk8O decision, the Eric J. court noted that
the Anaya finding that defendants were not liable for the injuries in-
flicted on their invitees in their apartment by another guest, who was
an ex-convict, was because the defendants had only generalized
knowledge of the criminal propensity of the guest.is' Therefore, the
factual basis for the Anaya holding that the defendants were not liable
for a failure to warn the other invitees was different from the case at
hand where the ex-convict's family members were specifically aware of
his dangerous propensities as indicated by his criminal history and his
probation offlcer.182
The Eric J. court also discussed the underlying basis of the plain-
tiffs argument in Anaya, that the dangerous propensities of an ex-
convict were "the functional equivalent of a dangerous animal." 8 3
The court dismissed this analogy of an ex-convict child molester to a
dangerous animal based upon the societal goal of rehabilitation of in-
dividuals who have been released after serving their criminal sen-
tence.' 8 4 Without a special relationship and without considering the
ex-convict to be a dangerous condition on the property, the residential
landowners/occupiers could not be held liable for failing to warn or
protect children on their premises under a premises liability
theory.'8 5
In 2001, a California court in Romero v. Superior Court'8 6 did find
a special relationship between the homeowners and two minors they
invited into their home to visit with their minor son, which visit re-
sulted in a sexual assault on one of the invitee minors by the other
invitee minor.' 8 7 This special relationship was based on the court's
adoption and application of a duty rule that:
an adult defendant who assumed a special relationship with a minor by invit-
ing the minor into his or her home will be deemed to have owed a duty of care
to take reasonable measures to protect the minor against an assault by an-
other minor invitee while in the defendant's home when the evidence and sur-
179. Id. at 555.
180. 199 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1984).
181. Eric J., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555-56. But see Kargul v. Sandpiper Dunes Ltd.
Pship, No. 50-56-00, 1991 WL 28051, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1991)
(holding a tenant, who allowed a person she knew to be dangerous to live with
her, liable to another tenant for failure to warn the other tenant about the crimi-
nal propensities of her guest).
182. Eric J., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556.
183. Id. at 556.
184. See id. at 557.
185. See id. at 558.
186. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801 (Ct. App. 2001).
187. See id. at 810.
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rounding circumstances establish that the defendant had actual knowledge of,
and thus must have known, the offending minor's assaultive propensities. 18 8
However, despite this special relationship, the court held that the
homeowners were not liable for the injuries to the invitee minor be-
cause there was not sufficient evidence indicating that the homeown-
ers had prior knowledge of the other minor's assaultive
propensities.1 8 9
In another recent California case, reported in the National Law
Journal, a jury awarded the plaintiff a nine million dollar judgment
for the shaking of a six-month old baby in a home child care facility.190
The owner of the house was the mother of the childcare operator and
the mother knew about an investigation of her daughter for child
abuse and failed to warn or protect the plaintiff from her daughter's
foreseeable criminal activity on the premises.19 1 This baby shaking
case can be distinguished from the Romero and Eric J. rulings because
the former involved a commercial childcare facility while the latter
two involved a social guest situation. However, these decisions impli-
cate the issue of whether there should be liability for failing to warn
others about the dangerous propensities of a human being on your
premises, particularly when minor children are involved, similar to
the liability of landowners who fail to warn others of dangerous ani-
mals on their premises.- 9 2
B. Lessor's Duty to Disclose Potential Danger to
Prospective Tenants During Rental Process for
Lease of Premises
Although a landlord may have a duty under common law to protect
tenants from foreseeable criminal activity by third parties, it is consid-
188. Id. at 812 (adopting and applying the "Chaney duty rule" from Chaney v. Supe-
rior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Ct. App. 1995)).
189. Romero, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813.
190. See Emily Heller, California Jury Reaches $9.9 Million Verdict in Baby-Shaking
Case, NAT'L L.J. (July 5, 2001) (discussing case litigated by Michael D. Stein, a
partner at Los Angeles law firm Tisdale & Nicholson, on a pro bono basis); see
also Jason W. Armstrong, Lawyer's Novel Theory Sways Jury in Baby-Shaking
Lawsuit, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 2, 2001, at 3.
191. See Saucier v. Romero, No. RCV 045367 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 26, 2000),
cited in Heller, supra note 190.
192. For examples of cases involving landowner liability for dangerous animals, see
Donchin v. Guerrero, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192, 201 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding landlord
liable for off site injuries if landlord is aware of dangerous animal being kept on
premises and it escapes because of defects in the property, such as a broken
fence); Portillo v. Aiassa, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 758 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding that
landowner owed duty of care to inspect his commercial property and remove or
restrain tenant's dog who injured invitee). But see Wylie v. Gresch, 236 Cal.
Rptr. 552, 553 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that "a landlord has no duty to warn a
prospective tenant of the presence of a vicious dog in the neighborhood").
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erably less certain whether a landlord has the duty to warn a prospec-
tive tenant of the potential for criminal activity in the complex prior to
leasing the premises. Indeed, if a prospective tenant asks the landlord
about the safety of the premises or whether the property is subject to
criminal activity, the landlord must answer truthfully or be subject to
liability for misrepresentation. However, even a misrepresentation as
to the safety of the premises may not justify holding the landlord lia-
ble to a tenant for injury suffered from third party criminal activity
unless the court determines that the injury was proximately caused by
the misrepresentation.
When Alex Yuzefovsky discussed his interest in renting an apart-
ment with the apartment complex's employees, he was told in re-
sponse to his specific question about safety "'that there had been no
crimes at [the property of] St. John's Wood, and that it was safe."193
In reliance on these assurances of safety, Alex leased the apart-
ment.19 4 Approximately one year and nine months later, Alex was as-
saulted and shot in the shoulder on a walkway inside the complex and
adjacent to his apartment. 195 The victimized tenant sued the apart-
ment owners alleging fraud, based on the misrepresentations of the
employees, and negligence because they failed to warn him of previous
violent crimes that had occurred at the development. 196
The Virginia Supreme Court in Yuzefovsky v. St. John's Wood
Apartments held that under the same foreseeability standard used to
determine whether there is a duty to protect, the owners did not have
a duty to warn the prospective tenant about crime in the neighborhood
because it was not imminent. 19 7 Although the court determined that
the tenant was fraudulently induced to enter into the lease, it held
that the damages suffered by Yuzefovsky as a result of the third-party
criminal attack did not directly result from the fraudulent inducement
because the assault was remote in time from the signing of the
lease.198 However, misrepresenting that the premises are safe and
free from criminal access or activity may also violate consumer fraud
statutes and, as discussed above, may subject the property owner to
liability for injury to a tenant from foreseeable criminal acts.1 99
193. Yuzefovsky v. St. John's Wood Apartments, 540 S.E.2d 134, 137 (Va. 2001).
194. See id. at 137.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 137-38.
197. Id. at 141 (citing Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, 540 S.E.2d 129, 132 (Va. 2001)).
198. See id. at 142.
199. See, e.g., O'Hara v. W. Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Mgmt., 142 Cal. Rptr. 487,
491 (Ct. App. 1977) (involving a tenant who relied on assurances that complex
was safe and brought a misrepresentation cause of action against apartment
owners for misrepresentation following her injury from rape by a man who had
assaulted several other women in the same complex); Rowe v. State Bank of Lom-
bard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1369-70 (Ill. 1988) (holding that landowner has duty to
warn tenants of security dangers especially when such information is known only
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The duty to disclose finds its roots in the tort of misrepresentation
and imposes a duty on the landowner to affirmatively acknowledge
defects in the premises, even if a prospective tenant does not ask
about the condition of the premises. At common law, a landlord had
no duty as to the condition of the premises under the doctrine of ca-
veat lessee. However, one of the exceptions to caveat lessee arose if
there was a latent defect in the premises known only to the landlord-
the defect was required to be disclosed. Therefore, if a physical defect
in the property makes the premises susceptible to crime, the landlord
will be required to disclose such a latent defect to a prospective ten-
ant.20 0 Additionally, the landlord may be under a duty to warn te-
nants about a danger of criminal activity even when the danger is not
the result of a physical property defect.201
Apartment owners in O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. Inter-
coast Management20 2 failed to disclose a "latent" danger of rape to a
female tenant who was raped in an apartment complex by a man who
had raped several other female tenants.2 0 3 The court concluded that
the landlords were potentially negligent because they knew of past
assaults and failed to act, by either providing security or warning the
tenant.2 0 4 However, in Bartley v. Sweetser,205 the Arkansas Supreme
Court upheld a summary judgment in the landlords' favor where a
tenant was raped in her apartment and alleged that the landlords had
failed to warn her that the apartment complex was vulnerable to
crime. 20 6 Under Arkansas law, a landlord has no duty to insure the
safety of its tenants or others on its premises.2 07
to the landowner); Petrauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Mgmt., Inc., 542 N.E.2d
902, 909 (MI1. App. Ct. 1989) (finding that tenant has right to receive damages for
a misrepresentation only if criminal act is foreseeable at time of
misrepresentation).
200. See, e.g., Whelan v. Dacoma Enters., 394 So. 2d 506, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(observing that landlord may be responsible for rape and assault of tenant if
there was a latent defect in the locking mechanism unknown to the tenant, but
known to the landlord); New Summit Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Nistle, 533 A.2d 1350,
1355 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (holding that "peepholes in appellee's bathroom
mirror constituted a latent defect in the apartment she rented" and landlords
owed a duty to disclose this known defect from which she suffered injury from
invasion of privacy by a third party).
201. See, e.g., N.W. by J.W. v. Anderson, 478 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(involving tenants that sued landlord for failing to warn them that another ten-
ant was a convicted child molester, but court held that because there was not a
specific threat against a specific victim, landlord had no duty to warn tenants of
criminal background of other tenant).
202. 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Ct. App. 1977).
203. Id. at 489.
204. Id. at 490.
205. 890 S.W.2d 250 (Ark. 1994).
206. Id. at 250.
207. Id. at 252.
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Landowners may also be held liable for failing to disclose suscepti-
bility of commercial premises to third party criminal activity.208 In
Vermes v. American District Telegraph Co.,209 a tenant jewelry store
sued the commercial landlord alleging that the landlord failed to dis-
close to the tenant prior to the signing of the lease that the premises
were insecure and, thus, unsuitable for a jewelry business requiring
physical security.21 0 The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that
the jury decision to hold the landlord liable based upon the foresee-
ability of the burglary was not clearly contrary to the evidence and
should be upheld.211
In contrast to this decision to hold a commercial landlord liable for
failing to disclose the potential for foreseeable criminal activity, the
Texas Supreme Court in Lefmark Management Co. v. Old212 con-
cluded that the property manager of a shopping center had no duty
under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 353, to disclose to a
subsequent management company that the premises were subject to
danger from criminal activity.2 13 Therefore, the transferor manage-
ment company had no liability to a tenant's customer who was killed
during the armed robbery of a donut shop for failing to disclose that
there had been several previous incidents of robbery and burglary at
the shopping center.21 4
Some states have statutorily required disclosure of specified items
to both prospective property purchasers and lessees. Of particular
concern is the disclosure of registered sex offenders living in the area
as required under the federal "Megan's Law."21 5 California Civil Code
section 2079.10a requires that written leases and rental agreements
for residential real property entered into on or after July 1, 1999, con-
tain a notice disclosing the existence of a database of registered sex
offenders maintained by law enforcement authorities. 216 This code
section also relieves the lessor of any further disclosure of specific in-
formation regarding the proximity of registered sex offenders and pre-
cludes the sex offender from bringing suit against the disclosing
lessor.2 17
208. See, e.g., Morris v. Barnette, 553 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that washateria business has duty to warn or provide reasonable protection to
invitees based on location of premises, past experience, and forseeability of third
party criminal conduct).
209. 251 N.W.2d 101 (Minn. 1977).
210. Id. at 105.
211. Id. at 106.
212. 946 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1997).
213. Id. at 54.
214. Id. at 53.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (Supp. V 1999).
216. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079.10a(a) (West 2001).
217. Id. at § 2079.10a(b).
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Unless there is a statutory disclosure requirement, it is uncertain
in many jurisdictions whether a residential landlord or a commercial
landlord has a duty to disclose to prospective tenants the susceptibil-
ity of the premises to third party criminal activity. In jurisdictions
recognizing the existence of a special relationship between landlord
and tenant,218 the landlord may have a duty to protect tenants
against foreseeable criminal acts and this duty may be most appropri-
ately accomplished by disclosure.
Since a landlord will probably not prevent harm to tenants from
the criminal acts of fellow tenants already permitted in the complex
by increasing security, the only way to protect other tenants from this
type of harm may be by disclosure of the dangerous tenant's criminal
propensities. If the jurisdiction considers the susceptibility of the
premises to criminal activity to be a latent defect, the common law
exception to caveat lessee may require the landlord to disclose this
susceptibility to prospective tenants. However, in jurisdictions which
refuse to acknowledge a special relationship between landlord and
tenant or which restrict the concept of latent defect to physical defects
only, courts will likely find that the landlord has no duty to disclose
either the criminal propensities of a fellow tenant or the susceptibility
of the premises to third party criminal acts.
In those jurisdictions finding a duty on the part of the landlord to
protect the tenant against third party criminal acts, the landlord may
have a duty to investigate their tenants, either prospectively or in re-
sponse to complaints by other tenants, to determine the tenant's pro-
pensity for criminal behavior. Part IV will discuss a landlord's duty to
investigate tenants and either refuse to rent to those with criminal
propensities or to evict those who appear to be dangerous to others. It
will also explore the potential landlord liability to victims for failing to
appropriately control a dangerous tenant. Finally, Part IV will also
address a landlord's liability to a potentially dangerous tenant for dis-
closing personal facts to other tenants in an attempt to discharge the
landlord's duty to protect or to warn other tenants.
C. Seller's Duty to Disclose Third Party Criminal Activity to
Property Purchasers
Unlike a landlord/tenant relationship, in which the parties have a
continuing relationship and the landlord may be liable for subsequent
injury, a seller of property has no duty to protect a subsequent pur-
chaser against criminal activity that may occur in the future. There-
fore, a duty to disclose does not arise from a special relationship
between buyer and seller, nor is it an appropriate response to a duty
to protect, since there is no such ongoing duty on the part of the seller.
218. See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text.
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In fact, under common law, the concept of caveat emptor relieves the
seller from any duty to make disclosures to a prospective buyer about
the condition of the premises. Nevertheless, the Prosser view, adopted
in California and other states, is that strict caveat emptor "is proper
only where the undisclosed fact is patent, the purchaser has an equal
opportunity to discover it, or the seller has no reason to think that the
purchaser is acting under any misapprehension."2 19 Thus, a seller
must "disclose conditions that the buyer could not be expected to dis-
cover by a diligent inspection, but which the seller knows or should
know would materially affect the value of the property to the
buyer."2 20
Although the susceptibility of property to third party criminal ac-
tivity is not necessarily a physical defect,22 1 it is a condition which the
buyer may or may not be expected to discover by a diligent inspection
and it may materially affect the property's value to the buyer. Similar
to situations involving property that is psychologically tainted by a
premises history involving such incidents as homicide, suicide, or pre-
vious occupancy by someone with AIDS or HIV, susceptibility of prop-
erty to criminal activity may be a condition that requires disclosure by
the seller, unless specifically shielded from disclosure by statute.22 2
The psychological taint issue was dramatically illustrated in
Stambosky v. Ackley,223 where a New York court held that an excep-
tion to the doctrine of caveat emptor was appropriate to hold a seller,
who "deliberately fostered the public belief that her home was pos-
sessed by poltergeists," liable for failing to disclose this information to
the property buyer.2 24 The court distinguished this nondisclosure
claim from typical cases where vendors have failed to disclose infor-
mation regarding the physical condition of the property. Here the con-
dition was a psychological taint created by the seller, which would
materially impair the value of the contract and was unlikely to be dis-
covered by a buyer exercising due care.2 25
Another notable psychological taint case involved the sale of a
house which was the site of a multiple murder.2 26 In Reed v. King,2 27
219. Karl B. Holzschue, Drafting and Negotiating of Contract for the Sale of a Single
Family Home and Closing, 426 PLI/REA 123, 153 (1998) (citing WLLLkm, L. PROS-
SER, LAw OF TORTS § 106, at 696 (4th ed. 1971)).
220. Ronald Benton Brown, Buyers Beware: Statutes Shield Real Estate Brokers and
Sellers Who Do Not Disclose That Properties Are Psychologically Tainted, 49
OxLA. L. REV. 625 (1996) (discussing property that is psychologically impacted by
issues such as ghosts, multiple murders, and AIDS).
221. However, physical defects such as broken locks not discoverable upon inspection
may make the premises unsafe and susceptible to third party criminal acts.
222. See generally Brown, supra note 220.
223. 169 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
224. Id. at 260.
225. Id. at 259.
226. Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983).
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a California court allowed a claim for nondisclosure where a seller and
the seller's agent failed to disclose to the buyer that a woman and her
four children were murdered in the home ten years earlier.228 Find-
ing that the murder was not a fact that a buyer should reasonably
have the burden of discovering, the court allowed the claim assuming
that the buyer could prove that the murder, as a psychological and
non-physical impact, has a significant effect on the market value of
the property.229
Since the cases of Stambosky and Reed were decided and the Fair
Housing Act was used to prevent unsolicited disclosure of AIDS, a ma-
jority of states have enacted shield statutes to remove the duty of sell-
ers and their agents to disclose psychological impacts relating to the
sale of property by defining certain stigmatizing events as "not mate-
rial facts."230 These statutes typically define what constitutes a psy-
chological impact and generally list such things as homicides,
suicides, other felonies, or the AIDS or HIV status of previous occu-
pants.231 However, many of these statutes also make clear that mis-
representations of fact by sellers or agents will not be protected
against tort liability.232
Except for one state, Indiana, shield statutes do not cover the dis-
closure of criminal activity in the general area.2 33 The Indiana stat-
ute shields those who do not disclose activities which may impact the
property in ways that are not just psychological, such as gang activity
and the manufacture or distribution of illegal drugs on the prop-
erty.23 4 These criminal activities may indicate the likelihood that
criminal acts may occur on or around the property in the future and
"could have a real impact on the future use and enjoyment of the prop-
erty" other than just a psychological taint.235
A case that illustrates how a criminal act that occurs on a property
may result in harm other than just a psychological taint on the prop-
erty is Van Camp v. Bradford.236 In Van Camp, the seller and the
seller's agent failed to disclose the fact that a rape had been commit-
ted against a former lessee's teenage daughter and the purchaser, a
single mother with a teenage daughter, suffered mental anguish when
subsequent rapes occurred in the neighborhood, her house was bur-
227. Id.
228. Id. at 133.
229. Id.
230. See Brown, supra note 220, at 628.
231. See id. at 628-29; see also Staff, State Statutes Dealing With HIV and AIDS: A
Comprehensive State-By-State Summary, 8 LAw & SEx 1 (1998).
232. See Brown, supra note 220, at 629.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 635-36.
235. Id. at 636.
236. 623 N.E.2d 731 (Ohio C.P. 1993).
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glarized, and she received threatening phone calls. 23 7 The defendants
argued that psychological impairments are not physical defects re-
quiring disclosure under exceptions to the caveat emptor doctrine.2 38
Finding that the stigma attached to the property was analogous to
a latent property defect, which is an exception to the caveat emptor
doctrine, the court refused to accept the defense of caveat emptor and
upheld the recognition of a cause of action for failure to disclose infor-
mation about psychologically tainted property.2 3 9 In addition, the
buyer asserted a claim against the defendants for misrepresentation
because when the buyer noticed bars on the basement windows and
asked the seller about the purpose and necessity of the bars, the seller
stated that a break-in had occurred sixteen years earlier and that
there was not a current problem with the property.240 The defendants
pointed to nondisclosure statutes in other states as an indication that
sellers should not be liable for failing to disclose stigmatizing events,
however the court found that these statutes "still require a good faith
response to an inquiry regarding a potential psychological
impairment. 2 41
While susceptibility of the property to criminal activity may cer-
tainly have more than just a psychological effect on the buyer, the
presence of a sex offender in the neighborhood is a psychological taint
that could also have ramifications as to the foreseeability of third
party criminal activity. "Megan's Law" was enacted in New Jersey
after a seven-year-old girl was raped and murdered in 1994 by a con-
victed pedophile who lived across the street.24 2 This law requires that
local authorities notify neighborhoods when convicted sex offenders
are released into the community. A federal version of Megan's Law
was enacted in 1996 in order to protect the public from what are con-
sidered by some to be reasonably foreseeable criminal acts.24 3 Be-
cause studies have shown that sex offenders have a risk of repeating
their behavior, even after imprisonment and rehabilitation efforts, all
fifty states now require some type of registration for released sex of-
fenders and many require community notification. 2 44
237. Id. at 734.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 736-37. Note that as of 1996, Ohio did not yet have a shield statute for
psychologically tainted property. See Brown, supra note 220, at 640.
240. Van Camp, 623 N.E.2d at 734.
241. Id. at 739 ("Nondisclosure statutes are not designed to allow sellers to make false
representations regarding property defects in response to affirmative questioning
by the buyer").
242. Brian J. Telpner, Constructing Safe Communities: Megan's Laws and the Pur-
poses of Punishment, 85 GEo. L.J. 2039 (1997).
243. Id. at 2039-40; see also 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d)(2) (Supp. V 1996) (requiring states to
"release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public" from sex
offenders in order to obtain federal anti-crime funds).
244. Telpner, supra note 242, at 2048-50.
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The type of community notification required under Megan's Law
legislation varies by jurisdiction and may involve active notification of
the public by local authorities or passive notification by providing a
database of information which the public may inspect.24 5 Disclosure
of registry information may also be limited depending upon the size of
the community, who is authorized to access the information, and the
level of risk that the offender will commit another crime.2 46 However,
in many cases, either directly or indirectly, homeowners will poten-
tially know whether or not there is a sex offender in the neighborhood.
Deciding whether a home seller is required to disclose the presence
of a sex offender in the neighborhood will be based on policy considera-
tions similar to those involved in the disclosure of facts which may
psychologically taint a particular property or neighborhood. These
policy considerations include the remaining viability of the caveat
emptor doctrine,247 whether such "defects" are actually "latent,"248
whether "off-site" hazards should be disclosed,249 moral obligations to
warn newcomers to the neighborhood,250 impact on the market value
of the premises,2 51 the availability of this information to the buyer
through other means,2 52 real estate brokers' disclosure duties,2 5 3 and
protection of the public against foreseeable off-site risks through dis-
closure. 25 4 Nevertheless, one major difference exists. The initial psy-
chological taint situations, such as a previous murder or an AIDS
death, do not involve a continuing danger of harm to the new occu-
pants whereas the presence of a sex offender may involve such a po-
tential danger.
245. Id. at 2050; see also Lori A. Polonchak, Surprise! You Just Moved Next to a Sex-
ual Predator: The Duty of Residential Sellers and Real Estate Brokers to Disclose
the Presence of Sexual Predators to Prospective Purchasers, 102 DicK. L. REV. 169,
176-78 (1997) (discussing four categories of methods used by various states to
notify the public of sex offenders).
246. See Telpner, supra note 241, at 2051 (stating that disclosure may be made only to
schools in some cases, but to the public in general if the risk of recidivism is high).
247. See Flavio L. Komuves, For Sale: Two-Bedroom Home with Spacious Kitchen,
Walk-in Closet, and Pervert Next Door, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 668, 676 (1997).
248. See id. at 680.
249. See id. at 690-94 (comparing California real estate disclosure law where home
seller in Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 456 (Ct. App. 1992), was
required to warn buyer about "noisy" neighbors, with New Jersey's approach,
which offers few protections for buyers where sellers fail to disclose off-site
hazards).
250. See id. at 697.
251. See id. at 700 (discussing whether a sex offender's presence in the neighborhood
is a fact material to the transaction).
252. See id. at 702-03 (discussing how a buyer's ability to discover information on this
issue impacts the application of the caveat emptor rule).
253. See id. at 704-05.
254. See id. at 705-06 (concluding that the expansion of the real estate seller's duty to
disclose "is consistent with the recognition of residents' right to know' of the pres-
ence of a sex offender in the community" to protect the public).
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The disclosure dilemma for real property sellers is especially oner-
ous in the situation where a parent of small children is warned of the
presence of a "sexually violent predator" in the neighborhood and de-
cides to sell her house.2 55 If she or her real estate broker disclose the
presence of this dangerous individual to potential purchasers, she will
likely experience a decrease in the market value of the property and
she may be unable to sell her home and move to protect her children
from the known danger in her neighborhood.256 This dilemma has
been addressed directly in some states by adding a provision to their
psychologically tainted or stigmatized property shield statutes stating
that the presence of sex offenders is a nonmaterial fact that does not
require disclosure. Other states have addressed this issue by enacting
specific statutes addressing the sole issue of whether the presence of a
sex offender needs to be disclosed.257
Some states only require that the real estate contract or lease
agreement contain statutorily specified language informing the buyer
or tenant where to find information about registered sex offenders. 2 58
This particular approach essentially makes the "defect" patent instead
of latent because the information can be obtained by the buyer or
lessee using the public records. By providing a notice to the property
transferee that the information about registered sex offenders is avail-
able, the burden to check the public sex offender registry is placed on
the transferee, analogous to the existing burden to check title, zoning
laws, building codes, etc. Buyers or renters may also have the ability
to check with the local police records to determine the level of criminal
activity in the neighborhood into which they are moving.
In 1999, the Arizona state legislature amended its Real Estate Dis-
closure Act to protect transferors, licensors, and lessors from liability
for failing to disclose not only AIDS, felonies, or deaths occurring on
255. See Polonchak, supra note 245, at 170.
256. See id.
257. See Tracy A. Van Wickler, H.B. 2564: The Real Estate Disclosure Act Threatens
Arizona's Children with Becoming "Megan" Victims, 32 Axiz. ST. L.J. 367, 384
(2000) (citing ALAsKA STAT. § 34.70.050 (1), (2) (Michie 1998); Amiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-2156(A)(3) (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); CAL. CIrv. CODE § 2079.10a (West
1985 & Supp. 1999); IDAHO CODE § 55-2701(3) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1999); NEv.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.770(2) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-50
(1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 858.514 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999-2000)); see
also LA. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 15:540 to 15:549 (West 2001), construed in Op. Atty.
Gen. No. 94-332, Sept. 2, 1994) (finding that "[t]he sex offender registration act
does not mandate disclosure of a known sex offender living in the neighborhood to
prospective homebuyers nor does it provide for compensation due to a decrease in
property values"); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 339:2518, 565:957 (West 2001); OR.
REv. STAT. § 696.880 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws, tit. 36, ch. 36-21A-134.1
(Michie 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 452.24, 704.50 (West 2001).
258. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.10a (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 565:957 (West 2001).
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the property, but also the fact that the property is located near a sex
offender, by declaring this fact to be "nonmaterial" to the real estate
transaction.2 59 Although sellers in Arizona may still feel a moral obli-
gation to disclose this information to prospective buyers, they will be
legally shielded by statute from having to make such a disclosure.
This Arizona shield statute appears to be in conflict with the pur-
pose of the state's Community Notification Statute that the public be
protected "through notification of sex offenders residing in the vicin-
ity."260 Because the Community Notification Statute requires that
the community be notified only when a sex offender first moves into
the area, new home buying or renting families will not be protected by
the "Megan's Law" notification. The Arizona Real Estate Disclosure
Act protects sellers and lessors from having to disclose the initial noti-
fication they received under the notification statute.26 1
Like the situation in Arizona, many states may have a perceived
conflict between real estate disclosure shield statutes and legislative
provisions designed to protect the public by notifying the community
about the presence of sex offenders. Those states which have added
protection for the nondisclosure of the presence of a sex offender in the
neighborhood to the shield statutes may be defeating the purpose of
Megan's Law. They fail to protect subsequent buyers and lessees from
dangerous individuals by not requiring at least warning of their
presence.
Situations where criminal activity is foreseeable differ from the
psychological taint cases because buyers may unknowingly confront
life-threatening danger when they purchase property that is suscepti-
ble to sex offenders or other third party criminal acts. Society has
already expressed an interest in protecting children from repeat sex
offenders by enacting various versions of Megan's Law and certainly
failing to disclose the presence of sex offenders, as well as other types
of foreseeable criminal activity in the neighborhood, puts the children
of unsuspecting buyers and lessees at risk.
Although all fifty states have enacted some form of "Megan's Law,"
many states have not yet legislatively addressed the real estate disclo-
sure issues associated with sex offender registration. Those state leg-
islatures that have acted have done so by protecting property
transferors and their agents who fail to disclose the presence of sex
offenders in the neighborhood. This protection cannot be reconciled
with the purpose of Megan's Law, which is to protect our most vulner-
259. See Wickler, supra note 257, at 368-69 (discussing Amxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-
2156 (West 1992)).
260. Id. at 370 (quoting CoNF. Coimi. MrNorry REP. ON H.B. 2564,41st Legis. Sess. 1
(Ariz. 1999)).
261. Id. at 370-71.
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able citizens, our children, by notifying the neighbors about the pres-
ence of registered sex offenders.
The comparable issue of whether sellers or lessors should disclose
the fact that there is a high or unusual level of criminal activity in the
area has not been legislatively addressed by most states. Both the sex
offender disclosure and criminal activity disclosure could help prevent
injury to otherwise unsuspecting transferees of the foreseeably dan-
gerous premises. Unless these facts are specifically excepted from a
duty to disclose by shield statutes, sellers or lessors could be liable for
failing to disclose facts material to a transferee's decision of whether
to move into the premises.
Protecting sellers, lessors, and real estate agents from liability for
failing to disclose a psychological taint or stigma associated with the
property, such as the fact that a person with AIDS lived and maybe
died on the property2 62 or that a murder or suicide occurred on the
property, is a legislative solution that makes sense in balancing sub-
jective and unpredictable responses to these facts by potential buyers
or lessees with preserving property marketability. Buyers or renters,
who find out about these facts after they have already moved onto the
premises, may be disturbed at some mental level, 26 3 but they and
their families are not in physical danger based upon these facts.
The presence of sex offenders and the foreseeability of third party
criminal activity in the neighborhood are continuing dangers that a
buyer or renter can protect against, but only when they are appropri-
ately informed. Thus, a sex offender's presence is not a fact that
should be included in a state's shield statutes. Instead, a state's real
estate disclosure law should reconcile the handling of these facts with
the Megan's Law legislation and should expressly state that a sex of-
fender's presence in the neighborhood is a materially adverse fact that
could impact a transferee's decision regarding the property
transaction. 2 64
Disclosure of these adverse facts will impact the marketability of
the property. However, the marketability of property is often im-
pacted by other off-premises factors such as the presence of a nearby
landfill, the type of businesses in the area, the reputation of the local
262. Disclosing AIDS information about the owner or occupier of property may consti-
tute discrimination under the federal Fair Housing Act. See Brown, supra note
220, at 644.
263. See id. at 646 (observing that shield statutes have shifted the burden of psycho-
logical taint and stigma to the buyers who may no longer want the property "be-
cause of their personal beliefs or sensitivities").
264. For those few states still adhering to the caveat emptor doctrine, these facts will
be considered material, but may not require disclosure because they are patent,
not latent defects, which can be discovered by the buyer through the use of public
records and the local police department.
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school district, or the nearby location of a group home 26 5 or halfway
house. If we must balance property values against the health and
safety of the future occupants of property, we must err on the side of
protecting our citizens by making them aware of the dangers around
them. We have seen this policy choice implemented by the enactment
of Megan's Law and other notification laws such as California's Pro-
position 65, which requires companies to notify citizens of health risks
in products and premises from toxic components.2 66
Misrepresentation about the presence of a sex offender in the com-
munity or the level of criminal activity in a neighborhood will be ac-
tionable, but only if the prospective buyer or tenant asks the right
questions. The policy of disclosure in real estate transactions, adopted
by the majority of states, allows buyers and lessees to make informed
decisions about one of the most important things in their lives-where
they are going to live and raise their families. 26 7 Disclosure of these
material adverse facts is not only morally right, it corresponds with
our current societal approach to help people make choices about how
to deal with the dangers in our society by properly informing them of
where the dangers exist.2 68
IV. LANDOWNER LIABILITY FOR DISCLOSURE OR REFUSAL
TO RENT OR SELL TO POTENTIALLY
DANGEROUS PERSONS
This part of the Article will discuss the impact of a dangerous per-
son's presence on the premises or in the vicinity from the aspect of the
landowner or possessor who has knowledge of this dangerous condi-
tion. First, assuming a landowner will be required to warn either a
prospective buyer, a current or prospective lessee, or the neighbors, of
the presence of a dangerous person on the premises or in the vicinity,
the issue will be whether the disclosing party should be subject to lia-
bility for such a disclosure. Second, in the case of a landlord, the land-
265. See Brown, supra note 220, at 644 (discussing Wisconsin's shield statute that
protects real estate agents from not disclosing the location of a nearby "adult
family home").
266. Proposition 65 which is also known as 'The Safe Water Drinking and Toxic En-
forcement Act of 1986" was passed on November 4, 1986. See AFL-CIO v.
Deukmejian, 260 Cal. Rptr. 479, 480-81 (Ct. App. 1989) (discussing Proposition
65 in detail and stating that the second operative part of the proposition is that it
"prohibits any person in the course of doing business from knowingly and inten-
tionally exposing, without prior clear and reasonable warning, any individual to
any chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity").
267. For a good discussion about the public policy considerations in favor of disclosure
and those against, see Thomas D. Larson, To Disclose or Not To Disclose: The
Dilemma of Homeowners and Real Estate Brokers Under Wisconsin's "Megan's
Law," 81 MARQ. L. Ray. 1161, 1192-97 (1998).
268. Other examples of disclosure include labeling on prescription drugs, warnings on
cigarettes and alcohol, consent forms in hospitals, etc.
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lord may face several issues such as whether to screen prospective
tenants for criminal propensity, refuse to rent to such individuals, or
evict tenants who are potentially dangerous to other tenants. If the
landlord does take action to protect other tenants, the landlord may
face claims from the dangerous tenant who has been subjected to the
landlord's protective actions.
A. Landowner's Disclosure of Private Facts to Warn Others
If a landowner learns of the criminal propensity of a person on
their premises and alerts others to this fact in order to protect them
from potential danger, is the landowner liable in tort to the potential
criminal? In jurisdictions where a landlord owes a duty to protect te-
nants against third party criminal acts, a landlord may be faced with
a decision either to warn tenants about the criminal propensities of
another tenant, or to evict the potentially offending tenant in order to
avoid harm to others. If the landowner discloses adverse information
about property possessors on the owner's premises, he or she may be
subject to liability for an invasion of the possessors' right to privacy or
possibly the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2 69
The right of privacy protects individuals against the publication of
private matter that "(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."270 Although
claims of invasion of privacy based on this type of publication are typi-
cally asserted against the media, landlords or landowners may also be
subject to such claims for disclosing information about a person's crim-
inal background to other tenants or to neighbors. However, facts con-
cerning a person's criminal record would be on the public record and
would not be considered private. Disclosure of this information would
most likely be offensive to the individuals who have been convicted,
but a criminal background, particularly one with sexual offenses, is a
public fact which is of legitimate public concern to those who are living
in close proximity to a person with such a record.2 7 1 In addition,
269. See Ray Dozier, A Consultant's View of the Future of Real Estate, J. REC.
(Oklahoma City), Aug. 25, 2000, 2000 WL 14297953 (predicting a "flood of pri-
vacy and should-have-been-told lawsuits" and predicting that the "sharing, or
disclosing, of data on tenants with others will be rigorously fought by lessees").
270. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS: PUBLICITY GIVEN TO PRIVATE LIFE § 652D
(1976).
271. See Elizabeth Kelley Cierzniak, There Goes the Neighborhood. Notifying the Pub-
lie When a Convicted Child Molester Is Released into the Community, 28 IND. L.
RFv. 715, 749-50 (1995) (noting that a community's flyer announcing the pres-
ence of a child molester in the neighborhood would probably not be considered an
invasion of privacy because the information has already appeared on the public
record, there is a reduced expectation of privacy, and it is a matter of public sig-
nificance); see also Doe v. Sears, 263 S.E.2d 119, 123 (Ga. 1980) (observing that a
tenant in default may have this information published to those who are con-
cerned and "general public properly is concerned with whether or not public hous-
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criminals, particularly sexual predators and those on probation or pa-
role, have a "reduced expectation of privacy because of the public's in-
terest in public safety."2 72 Some states, however, have determined
that a privacy action can go forward if the crime "occurred in the dis-
tant past and the offender has been rehabilitated. 2 7 3
In Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,274 the California Supreme
Court determined that a person convicted of a crime eleven years ear-
lier stated a valid cause of action for invasion of privacy by a publisher
who included his name in an article about hijacking, subjecting him to
injury by publicly disclosing his past criminal activity.2 75 The court
noted that although there are strong interests at stake in publication
of newsworthy events and the protection of privacy, the state has a
compelling interest in rehabilitating criminals and returning them to
society.2 76
Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim for invasion of privacy, a
trier of fact must determine "(1) whether the plaintiff had become a
rehabilitated member of society, (2) whether identifying him as a for-
mer criminal would be highly offensive and injurious to the reasonable
man, (3) whether defendant published this information with a reck-
less disregard for its offensiveness, and (4) whether any independent
justification for printing plaintiffs identity existed."2 77 Applying
these factors, a landowner should only disclose past criminal behavior
if it is truthful,278 if it appears that the person is not rehabilitated,
and if it is for the independent justification of warning those whom the
landowner has a duty to protect. The warning would contain the an-
nouncement that the other person has a continuing propensity for
ing tenants are paying their rentals when due"). But see Christy E. Ford, Duty To
Warn and Public Notification of the Release of Sex Offenders, 49 S.C. L. REV.
1131, 1134 (1998) (discussing the general duty to control or warn of the danger-
ous propensities of others and noting that "[e]ven the celebrated Tarasoff v. Re-
gents of University of California holding has since been narrowed to a duty to
warn only when a specific victim is identified").
272. See Cierzniak, supra note 271, at 719.
273. Id. at 750 (citing Conklin v. Sloss, 150 Cal. Rptr. 121, 124 (Ct. App. 1978); Briscoe
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. 1971)); see also Jones v. Taibbi, 512
N.E.2d 260, 269-70 (Mass. 1987) ("A person's arrest must be recorded by the po-
lice, and that record is public information. Moreover, the public has a right to be
informed about matters in which it has a legitimate concern.").
274. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
275. Id. at 44.
276. Id. at 43.
277. Id. at 44.
278. Making false or untrue statements might subject the landowner to a libel action.
See Baker v. Burlington N., Inc., 587 P.2d 829, 832-33 (Idaho 1978) (finding ter-
mination letter delivered to company officials regarding an employee who lied
about his criminal record on his application not libelous because it was truthful




dangerous activity.2 79 In the case of sex offenders, there is some sup-
port for the belief that these individuals are never rehabilitated and
that regardless of how much time has passed, it may not be an intru-
sion on their privacy to warn others of their propensity to commit this
type of crime.
B. Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from a Dangerous
Tenant
1. Duty to Investigate or Screen Prospective Tenants
One method for protecting tenants from the criminal activity of an-
other tenant is for the landlord to screen all prospective tenants dur-
ing the application process and reject those applicants with criminal
records or those who are potential criminals.2S0 Using a criminal re-
cord to reject a tenant should not call for potential liability for the
landlord. However, using certain factors to predict criminal propen-
sity, such as drug addiction, may be considered a violation of the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) since the FHAA prohibits
discrimination against handicapped individuals. Individuals with a
past record of problems due to drug use or addiction would be consid-
ered handicapped unless they are currently using drugs or addicted to
them.281
A criminal record or a record of mental health problems might im-
plicate a landlord's duty to protect other tenants from reasonably fore-
seeable criminal activity by excluding such tenants. 28 2 Nevertheless,
"[a] landlord is not competent to assess the dangerous propensities of
his mentally ill tenants," and assessing whether a tenant might be
279. The right of privacy is not absolute and invasions may be justified for business
reasons. See Elmore v. Atl. Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding intrusion into person's seclusion in store restroom justified by store's
"interest in providing crime-free rest rooms for its customers, and there existed
sufficient cause for suspicion of criminal activity to justify any intrusion which
occurred"); Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 818 (N.D. 1998)
(finding that a Sears employee's alleged intrusion of privacy of a person mastur-
bating in the store's public restroom was "consistent with his work
responsibilities").
280. See Glesner, supra note 70, at 780.
281. Id. at 781 (noting that a "landlord may ask only whether the prospective tenant is
a current drug user/addict or has been convicted of manufacturing or distributing
illegal drugs" and that this question must be asked of all applicants, not just
selected ones).
282. Guzin Collins, Landlords & Tenants: Mobile Home Issues Governed by Manufac-
tured Home Act, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 13, 2001, at 18 (observing that if prior
criminal record is found based on check of prospective tenant, landlord is allowed
to refuse to rent if"it involved harm to persons or property, and is likely to cause
a clear and present threat to the health and safety of other persons").
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subject to violent behavior against other tenants is difficult for even
the best-trained mental health expert.28 3
Encouraging landlords to perform exhaustive screening of appli-
cants in order to protect other tenants is not necessarily in the best
interests of public policy because it does not further the goals of the
criminal rehabilitation system for "ex-criminals" to be denied housing
as they attempt to assimilate back into society. An analogous legal
issue is whether to hold employers liable for the criminal acts of their
employees against other employees based on a claim of negligent
hiring.28 4
In a case involving a negligent hiring claim, the Michigan Supreme
Court in Hersh v. Kentfield Builders, Inc.28 5 explained that "an em-
ployer must use due care to avoid the selection or retention of an em-
ployee whom he knows or should know is a person unworthy, by
habits, temperament, or nature, to deal with the persons invited to the
premises by the employer." 286 Determining that a jury, rather than a
judge, should decide whether or not the employer knew or should have
known of the employee's vicious propensities, the court noted that "the
mere fact that a person has a criminal record, even a conviction for a
crime of violence, does not in itself establish the fact that that person
has a violent or vicious nature" such that the employer should not hire
the individual.287 The court also expressed sympathy for the lower
court's concern "for those persons who, having been convicted of a
crime, have served the sentence imposed and so are said to have paid
their debt to society and yet find difficulty in obtaining employ-
ment."288 Similarly, landlords should not necessarily be found negli-
gent for renting to a tenant with a past criminal background if that
tenant later injures another tenant in an act that is unforeseeable to
the landlord.
Another problem landlords may face in the investigation of pro-
spective tenants is that it may be the child of the prospective tenant
who has a record of previous criminal activity or who is on a list of
sexual offenders. If the landlord screens only the parents for criminal
records and checks the sex offender registry for the parents, the juve-
nile's information will not be revealed. In fact, most jurisdictions will
protect a juvenile offender from public disclosure, in which case the
283. See Gill v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 130 A.D.2d 256, 263 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
284. See Michael F. Wais, Negligent Hiring-Holding Employers Liable When Their
Employees' Intentional Torts Occur Outside of the Scope of Employment, 37
WAYNE L. REv. 237, 255-58 (1990) (discussing societal concerns of analogous is-
sue regarding an employer's screening of employee applicants).
285. 189 N.W.2d 286 (Mich. 1971).
286. Id. at 288.




information will not be publicly available to either the landlord or to
the other tenants.
Recently, some homeowners associations have prohibited sex of-
fenders, who have a high risk of reoffending, from residency within
the association. 28 9 In Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners
Ass'n,290 the association amended its rules to prohibit a Tier 3 of-
fender (the most serious offender on New Jersey's Megan's Law regis-
try)291 from residing in Panther Valley.2 9 2 One of the association
members claimed that this amendment was "an unlawful infringe-
ment on her right to alienate her property."293 The court determined
that the restriction on her right to sell or lease was very limited since
there are only about 80 people out of a population of 8.4 million who
would be prohibited from buying or leasing from her.2 94 Additionally,
the court noted that the restriction does not fall on her unfairly be-
cause it affects all association members equally; the association mem-
ber was not a proper party to vindicate the rights of a Tier 3 offender;
and Tier 3 offenders and convicted criminals are not protected under
state discrimination laws.2 95
The Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners Ass'n court did
express concern that if a large number of common interest develop-
ments in the state adopt similar restrictions, the housing market for
these high risk offenders would be very limited and might "approach
'the ogre of vigilantism and harassment,' the potential dangers of
which the Supreme Court recognized even while upholding the consti-
tutionality of Megan's Law."296 It also noted that the association
might be viewed as a government actor and subject to constitutional
constraints because some of the functions it performs are quasi-mu-
nicipal in nature.297
289. See Debra Baker, Slamming the Door: N.J. Court Lets Homeowners Turn Down
Renters, Buyers on Megan's Law List, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2000, at 24.
290. 766 A.2d 1186 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
291. See Baker, supra note 289, at 24.
292. Mulligan, 766 A.2d at 1192.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1192-93.
296. Id. at 1192-93 (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 422 (N.J. 1995)).
297. Id. at 1193. For a discussion about the constitutionality of Megan's Law, see
Cierzniak, supra note 271, at 727-50; Daley, supra note 7; Earl-Hubbard, supra,
note 7; Donna-Marie Korth & Candace Reid Gladston, Megan's Law Should Sur-
vive the Latest Round of Attacks, 13 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COVMENT. 565 (1999);
Maria Orecchio & Theresa A. Tebbett, Sex Offender Registration: Community
Safety or Invasion of Privacy?, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMvNT. 675 (1999); Jen-
nifer L. Poller, Provisions of Megan's Law Held Unconstitutional: State Should
Bear Burden of Proof in Sexually Violent Predator Proceeding, 1 No. 12 LAw. J. 2
(Sept. 10, 1999); Small, supra note 7.
[Vol. 80:522
MY BROTHER'S KEEPER?
Once the landlord has appropriately screened a prospective tenant,
the landlord may refuse to rent to the individual so long as excluding
the tenant does not violate public policy or civil rights. 29 s If the land-
lord determines that despite a criminal record the prospective tenant
has been rehabilitated and is not a risk to other tenants, there will
probably not be a need to warn other tenants of the criminal back-
ground because criminal activity will not be foreseeable.
An authorized check of a prospective tenant's background in Ste-
phens v. Greensboro Properties, Ltd.299 revealed that the individual
had a history of arrests and convictions of violent crimes, although he
had not been convicted of any felony within the prior five years.30 0
The policy of the property management company was to disapprove
any tenant with a felony conviction within the last five years, but
shortly after renting to this convicted felon, the policy was changed to
exclude any convicted felon from residency.301 Nevertheless, the
property manager agreed to lease an apartment to the individual and
he was later hired as the apartment complex's maintenance man.3 0 2
The fourteen-year-old son of one of the tenants was shot and killed by
the maintenance man and the decedent's mother sued the property
owners and managers alleging negligence by allowing the perpetrator
to become both a resident and an employee of the complex.303
The Stephens court determined that a jury must decide whether
the property manager was negligent by renting to an individual with a
long history of arrests and convictions for violent crimes based on
whether the assault on his co-tenant was reasonably foreseeable and
whether the property owner failed to exercise ordinary care in guard-
ing against such an occurrence.3 04 However, the management was
not negligent per se since its rules only excluded a tenant with felony
convictions which had occurred within the last five years and the of-
fending tenant's convictions occurred previous to the five year
period.305
298. See Montgomery L. Effinger, Premises Liability and Owner's Duty: Adequate Se-
curity for the Enemy Within, 70 N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1998, at 51. Landlords or
managers of federally-assisted housing will be required to refuse to rent to sex
offenders who are subject to lifetime registration under a state program. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 13663(a) (West 2001); see also Jennifer S. Fahey, Landlord Liability in
West Virginia for Criminal Acts on the Premises, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 659, 674
(1996) (noting that "a private landlord in West Virginia may consider any criteria
in screening prospective tenants, including criminal convictions, subject only to
constitutional and statutory limits").
299. 544 S.E.2d 464 (2001).
300. Id. at 466.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 468.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 469.
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If a jurisdiction holds the landlord liable for the criminal acts of
one tenant against another tenant and the court determines that the
landlord had knowledge of the criminal propensity prior to renting,
the landlord may be taking a risk to rent to any individual with a
criminal record. Just like taking the risk that the rent will not be paid
by renting to individuals with a bad credit record, a landlord may be
taking the risk that an applicant with a criminal record will injure
another tenant and the landlord will be liable.
Jurisdictions determining whether or not to hold a landlord liable
for the foreseeable criminal acts of one tenant against another must
decide who will bear the risk of crime-the landlord or the innocent
tenant victim. Because the landlord is in the best position to avoid the
harm to the tenant victim by thoroughly screening incoming tenants
and either rejecting them or warning other tenants, the landlord
should bear the risk of foreseeable criminal activity against its te-
nants if it results from the landlord's negligence in either screening,
renting, or failing to warn others.306
Assuming the landlord is held liable for foreseeable criminal acts
by one tenant against another for negligently renting to the offending
tenant, there will be an issue as to whether the landlord has a contin-
uing duty to check the local police records for information regarding
its current tenants. If the landlord determines during the tenant's oc-
cupancy that the tenant has a criminal propensity based upon police
reports or complaints from other tenants, the landlord may be under a
duty to either evict the offending tenant or, at a minimum, warn other
tenants in the complex.30 7 As discussed above, the landlord should
have a heightened duty to disclose the presence of a sex offender to
other tenants in order to protect individuals particularly susceptible
to such crimes, such as children. Apartment complexes are typically
very close living environments with shared common areas such as
laundry rooms, playgrounds, and pools. These close living arrange-
ments make it easier for innocent tenants to fall victim to a criminal
tenant living in the apartment complex.
306. See Glesner, supra note 70, at 782-83 (discussing how a landlord can shift the
risk of crime by using lease provisions "requiring tenants to indemnify landlords
for the tenant's own criminal activities, through waiver clauses excusing the
landlord from responsibility for the criminal acts of third parties (even if the
landlord's negligence enhanced the risk of crime), and through security deposit
provisions financing security measures and defraying liability stemming from the
tenant's actions").
307. See id. at 715 (noting that "it is likely that a duty to police tenants will develop
further" and that the "extension of landlord liability to include tenants' criminal
activities could serve to reduce the incidence of crime").
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2. Evicting Dangerous Tenants
If a landlord discovers during the course of a tenant's occupancy
that the tenant is dangerous to others in the complex, the landlord
may have a duty to evict the offending tenant. Although a landlord
may refuse to rent to a convicted felon based upon a screening process,
discovering later that the tenant has a criminal record or is a regis-
tered sex offender may not be sufficient grounds to terminate a ten-
ancy once the lease has been signed.
In Lambert v. Doe,308 the landlord had an opportunity to require a
juvenile sex offender to vacate the complex without giving a reason
because the lease expired and was renewed only on a month-to-month
basis.3 0 9 The landlord continued to rent to a mother whose twelve
year-old son had sexually molested several other children in the com-
plex and management had enough information to know that it was
reasonably foreseeable that the boy would continue to victimize young
children in the complex.3io The court determined that the landlord
could have refused to renew the lease on a month-to-month basis and
that the terms of the lease gave the landlord the right to terminate if a
tenant or guest creates a nuisance or annoyance to another tenant,
which the boy's actions in this case certainly did.31 The court upheld
the jury's verdict in favor of a nine-year-old resident who was sexually
molested, finding that "the jury could have properly concluded that
the landlord should reasonably have been expected to warn new te-
nants, such as the Does, of the potential threat posed by Sean Roe to
young children in the complex, notwithstanding the landlord's fear
that such warning might have exposed it to a possible slander suit." 3 ' 2
Local codes and laws will guide whether a landlord must show
"just cause" to terminate a tenancy.31 3 In New York, a landlord is
308. 453 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
309. Id. at 848.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. But see Molosz v. Hohertz, 957 P.2d 1049, 1050 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (finding
that landlords who rented a rural home to their adult son owed no duty to neigh-
bor for negligent retention of a violent tenant resulting in injury when the tenant
son fired several shots through the neighbor's windows); Smith v. Howard, 489
So. 2d 1037, 1038 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "Housing Authority does not
have a duty to evict persons with reportedly violent propensities nor to maintain
its own private police protection of its premises"); Blatt v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth.,
123 A.D.2d 591, 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that New York City Housing
Authority had no duty to evict tenant who later shot a cotenant after a personal
dispute involving a romantic relationship).
313. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.12.030(5) (West 2000) (providing that land-
lord may terminate lease of tenant who commits waste, nuisance, or engages in
unlawful activity on premises). This is not an issue for month-to-month leases
where the landlord can terminate a lease with proper notice, but only for long-
term leases being terminated before the end of the lease.
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required to show that the tenant "has conducted himself in a non-de-
sirable way" in order to evict.314 The court in Gill v. New York City
Housing Authority3s 5 determined that the tenant parents' refusal to
cooperate with an investigation of their son's psychiatric condition
was not grounds for eviction and that prior to the stabbing of a coten-
ant by their son, there was no evidence supporting an eviction ac-
tion.316 The court stressed that under the New York City Housing
Authority rules, "it is not upon the mere prospect of future misconduct
that a non-desirability eviction proceeding may be premised, but upon
misconduct which has actually occurred."317
Just cause is required to evict a tenant from public housing, but it
does not include the criminal activities of family members or guests
over which the tenant has been unsuccessful in controlling.318 When
family members or guests of an apartment resident -are involved in
criminal activity such as drug dealing, a housing authority does not
have a right under the U.S. Housing Act,319 to evict a tenant for the
wrongdoing of these third parties unless it can show some type of cul-
pability.3 20 In Rucker v. Davis,321 the Ninth Circuit determined that
although "tenants who personally engage in drug activity or... te-
nants who turn a blind eye to the activities of household members or
guests" can be evicted, an innocent tenant, who has already taken rea-
sonable steps to prevent third-party drug activity, cannot be evicted
from public housing without some other showing of good cause.32 2
Unless the court finds that a landlord had a duty to evict an offend-
ing tenant, other tenants in the complex will not be allowed to termi-
nate their leases or claim damages from the criminal acts of another
tenant under theories such as the covenant of quiet enjoyment or the
implied warranty of habitability. In Williams v. Gorman,323 the court
held that because the violent tendencies of a tenant who lived upstairs
from the victim were not known to the landlord, there was no duty to
evict the tenant in advance of a gunshot blast through the victim's
ceiling.324 The court also found that the victim's damages could not be
314. Gill v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 130 A.D.2d 256, 262 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (citing
Tejada v. Christian, 71 A.D.2d 527, 529 (N.Y. App. Div 1979)).
315. Id. at 262.
316. Id. at 261-65.
317. Id. at 265.
318. See Oakland Hous. Auth. v. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 338 (2001); Rucker v. Davis, 237
F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. v.
Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 24 (2001).
319. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437d(l)(6) (West 2001).
320. See Rucker, 237 F.3d at 1126.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1120-21.
323. 520 A.2d 761 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
324. Id. at 765.
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compensated as a breach of an implied warranty of habitability be-
cause the criminal conduct of the tenant was not foreseeable.3 2 5
Similarly, in North Ridge Apartments v. Ruffin,326 the Virginia Su-
preme Court held that a tenant who wished to terminate her lease
because she felt unsafe in the leased premises and was afraid of crime
could not assert the theory of constructive eviction because the land-
lord had no duty to protect her from the criminal acts of an unknown
third party.3 2 7 The court held that "because there was no duty on the
lessor in this case to control third parties' criminal conduct, the failure
of the lessor to protect the lessee from such conduct cannot be deemed
an intentional act of omission" which would establish constructive
eviction.3 28
V. CONCLUSION
Under common law principles, landowners do not have a duty to
protect or warn others against the criminal activities of others that
occur on their premises. However, the modern trend in tort law has
been to hold landowners liable for injuries occurring on their premises
if the criminal activity is reasonably foreseeable and, in some jurisdic-
tions, also imminent. Liability assessment requires that the plaintiff
establish the landowner's duty to the victim, the breach of that duty
through the negligence of the landowner, and that the breach proxi-
mately caused the plaintiffs injury.
Although duty has sometimes been based on the existence of a spe-
cial relationship such as business possessor/invitee or landlord/tenant,
or more recently, employer/employee or bank/ATM customer, other
theories such as the latent defect exception to caveat lessee, the im-
plied warranty of habitability, exceptions to caveat emptor, and statu-
tory disclosure legislation have resulted in landowner liability for
failure to protect or warn against foreseeable criminal acts. Once
landowner liability to victims of third party criminal activities is es-
tablished, courts modernly struggle with issues such as comparative
liability, apportionment of damages between the landowner and the
perpetrator, and whether insurance will provide coverage or exclusion
under premises insurance policies.
Jurisdictions are divided as to whether landowners should be re-
sponsible for failing to protect possessors or invitees against foresee-
able criminal activity. Exceptions to the common law "no duty to aid"
rule have been based on policy decisions that either a special relation-
ship requires such protection or that the landowner is in the best posi-
325. Id.
326. 514 S.E.2d 759 (Va. 1999).




tion, both in knowledge and financial means, to protect against the
foreseeable harm. Jurisdictions supporting a landowner's duty to pro-
tect may also support a duty to warn as one way to protect the foresee-
able victim. However, the contours of a duty to warn or disclose the
potential for criminal activity are not nearly as well-developed as the
theory of the landowner's duty to protect under premises liability
rules.
In circumstances where a landowner cannot protect against third
party criminal activity by making physical changes to the premises
such as installing security fences, locks, extra lighting, guards, etc.,
disclosure by the landowner of known criminal danger is the only way
to protect innocent victims. If a landowner is aware of criminal activ-
ity in the area or of the criminal propensity of a person living either
near or on the premises, the landowner may have a duty to disclose
this information to either a purchaser or a lessee of the property.
In the case of a landlord/tenant relationship, the landlord may
have an ongoing duty to protect the tenant against foreseeable crimi-
nal activity by warning the tenant of the potential danger associated
with premises occupation. This duty may include not only a duty to
disclose this information to the tenant at the time of rental, but to
screen other prospective tenants for criminal propensity, evict existing
tenants who are either involved in criminal activity or have a known
propensity for such activity, or warn existing tenants of newly discov-
ered information about the criminal propensity of another tenant.
The emergence of Megan's Law legislation in all fifty states has
expanded a community's knowledge of the existence of registered sex
offenders living in the area with the express policy of protecting chil-
dren against harm from repeat offenders through the disclosure pro-
cess. However, several states have legislatively protected home
sellers and lessors who fail to disclose their knowledge of nearby sex
offenders. These shield statutes state that such information is not
material to the transaction, similar to other psychological taints such
as a prior murder in the house or the fact that a prior occupant had
AIDS. Unfortunately, shielding landowners from liability for failing
to disclose the existence of nearby criminals is in direct conflict with
Megan's Law legislation which was enacted to protect the susceptible
against criminal acts.
Requiring landowners to disclose the potential for criminal activity
on or nearby the premises being rented or sold will most likely have a
detrimental impact on the market value of the premises and the
neighborhood. However, such disclosure may be appropriate since the
common law rule that there is no duty to aid others has been undercut
by modem recognition that a landowner may have the duty to protect
others from reasonably foreseeable criminal activity.
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Jurisdictions recognizing premises liability for reasonably foresee-
able injury from third party criminal activities should require disclo-
sure of these dangers prior to actual injury in order to protect lessees
or purchasers from harm. At a minimum, even in those jurisdictions
which maintain that a landowner has no duty to aid others on the
premises, the existence of a sex offender in the neighborhood should
be disclosed to lessees or purchasers in order to fulfill the public policy
concerns expressed by the nationwide enactment of Megan's Law.
Finally, landowners should not fear liability for disclosing the
criminal propensity of an individual to other occupants or potential
occupants of their premises. While such disclosure would probably be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, it would be of legitimate con-
cern to the public. If the disclosure was based upon an existing crimi-
nal record, such facts would be on the public record and would not be
considered private. However, landowners may be liable under a pri-
vacy action if the crime was committed in the remote past and the
criminal has been rehabilitated. In the case of a known sex offender,
it is unlikely that a disclosure of this information, no matter how dis-
tant, will be considered an invasion of privacy if it can be shown that
there is a legitimate expectation that future criminal acts might be
committed against children. Therefore, landowners who are aware of
reasonably foreseeable criminal activity against occupiers of their
premises should have a duty to disclose this information to either pro-
spective or existing occupiers, particularly when there is a potential
danger of harm to the most vulnerable members of our society,
children.
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